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Reasoning about proof and knowledge
Steffen Lewitzka ∗
Abstract
In previous work [Lewitzka, Log. J. IGPL 2017], we presented a hier-
archy of classical modal systems, along with algebraic semantics, for the
reasoning about intuitionistic truth, belief and knowledge. Deviating from
Go¨del’s interpretation of IPC in S4, our modal systems contain IPC in the
way established in [Lewitzka, J. Log. Comp. 2015]. The modal operator can
be viewed as a predicate for intuitionistic truth, i.e. proof. Epistemic prin-
ciples are partially adopted from Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic IEL [Arte-
mov and Protopopescu, Rev. Symb. Log. 2016]. In the present paper, we
show that the S5-style systems of our hierarchy correspond to an extended
Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation and are complete w.r.t. a re-
lational semantics based on intuitionistic general frames. In this sense, our
S5-style logics are adequate and complete systems for the reasoning about
proof combined with belief or knowledge. The proposed relational seman-
tics is a uniform framework in which also IEL can be modeled. Verification-
based intuitionistic knowledge formalized in IEL turns out to be a special
case of the kind of knowledge described by our S5-style systems.
MSC: 03B45; 03B42; 03F45; 03G10
Keywords: modal logic, epistemic logic, intuitionistic logic, proof predicate,
BHK interpretation, general frame, non-Fregean logic, self-reference
∗Instituto de Matema´tica e Estatı´stica, Departamento de Cieˆncia da Computac¸a˜o, Universidade
Federal da Bahia UFBA, 40170-110 Salvador – BA, Brazil, e-mail: steffenlewitzka@web.de
1
1 Introduction
In previous research [12, 13, 14, 15], we studied Lewis-style modal logics which
have the property that strict equivalence (ϕ ≡ ψ) := (ϕ ↔ ψ) satisfies the ax-
ioms of propositional identity, i.e. certain identity axioms coming from Suszko’s
non-Fregean logics [7, 18].1 The condition ‘strict equivalence = propositional
identity’, satisfied by some logics in the vicinity of S1, particularly by S3–S5,
warrants completeness w.r.t. a non-Fregean-style, algebraic semantics [12]. Logic
L, introduced in [13], has that property and combines classical propositional logic
CPC with intuitionistic propositional logic IPC in the following sense:
(1) Φ ⊢IPC ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢L ϕ, where Φ := {ψ | ψ ∈ Φ},
for any set of propositional formulas Φ ∪ {ϕ}. In particular, ϕ is a theorem of
IPC iff ϕ is a theorem of L. Thus, the map ϕ → ϕ is an embedding of IPC
into L. L is a classical modal logic for the reasoning about intuitionistic truth.
The modal operator , applied to propositional formulas, can be regarded as a
truth predicate for intuitionistic truth in IPC. More precisely, for any prime theory
Φ (i.e. rooted Kripke model) of IPC there is a model of L such that for any
propositional ϕ, ϕ is classically true in the model of L iff ϕ is intuitionistically
true in the corresponding Kripke model, i.e. ϕ ∈ Φ. The other way round, every
model of L gives rise to such a corresponding prime theory of IPC.
More generally, the scheme ϕ ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤) is valid for all formulas ϕ (see
Theorem 3.6 below), where ϕ ≡ ⊤ means that ϕ holds intuitionistically. That
scheme recalls the T-scheme (Convention T) of Tarski’s truth theory. In our set-
ting, the truth predicate  stands for intuitionistic truth and is an element of the
object language.
Recall that the standard way to interpret IPC in a classical modal logic is given
by Go¨del’s translation ϕ 7→ ϕ′ of IPC into S4, where ϕ′ results from ϕ by prefix-
ing every subformula with  (sometimes is used a different, though equivalent,
translation). Go¨del showed that if ϕ is a theorem of IPC, then ϕ′ is a theorem of
S4. His conjecture that also the converse holds, i.e.
(2) ⊢IPC ϕ⇔ ⊢S4 ϕ
′,
1These natural axioms ensure that the identity connective ≡ is a congruence relation modulo
any given theory. We read ϕ ≡ ψ as “ϕ and ψ have the same meaning (denotation, Bedeutung)” or
“ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition”. We strictly distinguish between formulas (syntactical ob-
jects) and propositions (semantic entities): a formula denotes a proposition. This is in accordance
with our non-Fregean, intensional, view on logics: the semantics of a formula is, in general, more
than its truth value. The Fregan Axiom (ϕ↔ ψ)→ (ϕ ≡ ψ) is not valid (see [18]).
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was finally proved by McKinsey and Tarski (see, e.g., [2, 16] for further historical
background). The equivalence (2) particularly means that constructive reasoning
is encoded in classical modal system S4 and can be recovered from it. In fact,
Go¨del considered S4 as a provability calculus. Artemov [1] developed a logic of
explicit proofs, called LP, giving an adequate semantics to Go¨del’s provability cal-
culus S4. LP represents an exact formalization of the BHK interpretation of IPC.
Note, however, that S4 contains IPC only in codified form. That is, intuitionistic
reasoning is not mirrored explicitly. In contrast, logic L contains, in the sense of
(1), a faithful copy of IPC and reflects intuitionistic reasoning in a direct way. The
modal operator is a predicate for instuitionistic truth: For any given model of L,
‘ϕ holds classically⇔ ϕ is intuitionistically true’. Of course, that equivalence
does not hold in the context of S4. We believe these are properties that count in
favor of L as a calculus for the reasoning about proof as intuitionistic truth.
In this paper, we will argue that L5, i.e. the S5-style extension of L, is an
adequate logic for the reasoning about proof in the sense of BHK semantics. This
may appear surprising in view of the above mentioned classical results due to
Go¨del, McKinsey, Tarski and Artemov which all rely on modal system S4 as a
classical modal interpretation of intuitionistic logic. By results of [13], IPC is
contained in L as a faithful copy via the embedding ϕ 7→ ϕ. Intuitively, L con-
tains its own proof predicate: each formula ϕ reads “ϕ is true in a constructive
sense”, even if  occurs in ϕ. In this paper, we shall describe that intuition by
an extended BHK interpretation with a proof-reading clause for the proof predi-
cate itself, i.e. for formulas of the form ϕ. It turns out that the extended BHK
semantics not only validates the axioms of L but also the S5-style modal princi-
ples of the stronger logic L5. This means in particular that L and its extensions
L3 and L4 are not strong enough to formalize all reasoning principles valid un-
der (extended) BHK semantics. A main result of our research is the construction
of a relational semantics, based on intuitionistic general frames, which combines
constructive reasoning with modal principles of system S5. This semantics can be
viewed as a formal counterpart of the extended BHK interpretation. Our S5-style
logics (L5 and its epistemic extensions) turn out to be sound and complete w.r.t.
that relational semantics. This result formally confirms L5 as an adequate and
complete classical logic for the reasoning about proof as intuitionistic truth.
The existence of a proof predicate in the object language suggests an explicit
distinction between actual proofs, i.e. effected constructions, and possible proofs
as a kind of hypothetical constructions. ϕ reads “ϕ has an actual proof”, i.e.
ϕ is intuitionistically true. We say that “ϕ has a possible proof” (or “a proof
of ϕ is possible”), notation: ♦ϕ, if ¬ϕ has no actual proof, i.e. ¬¬ϕ holds
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classically. In this sense, the possibility of a proof of a proposition means the
absence of an actual proof of its falsehood. In a positive sense, we may understand
a possible proof also as ‘conditions on a construction’ instead of a construction
itself.2 These conditions must not be in conflict with effected constructions. For
example, consider ¬¬ϕ versus ¬¬ϕ. The former formula says that ¬¬ϕ is
intuitionistically true, intuitively: “ϕ cannot be false” or, in other words, “¬ϕ has
no possible proof”. Of course, if ¬ϕ has no possible proof, then ¬ϕ has no actual
proof. In classical logic L, we are able to formalize that intuitive fact by
¬♦¬ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ, i.e. ¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ.
Actually, that formula is a theorem of L (see the general case in item (iii) of The-
orem 3.7 below). Now, observe that that implication cannot be expressed in IPC,
even if ϕ is a pure propositional formula: while¬¬ϕ corresponds to intuitionis-
tic truth of ¬¬ϕ, the weaker statement ¬¬ϕ, “¬ϕ is not intuitionistically true”
=“ϕ has a possible proof”, corresponds to no formula in IPC. The more expressive
logic L makes the distinction between actual proof and possible proof explicit.
In [15], we enriched L3–L5 with epistemic axioms which are inspired by
principles of Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic IEL introduced by Artemov and Pro-
topopescu [4]. IEL relies on the intuition that proof, as the strictest kind of a
verification, yields verification-based belief and knowledge. This is expressed
by the axiom of intuitionistic co-reflection ϕ → Kϕ. Furthermore, the classical
knowledge axiom of reflection, Kϕ → ϕ, is replaced by intuitionistic reflection
Kϕ→ ¬¬ϕ, which reads “known propositions cannot be intuitionistically false”.
IEL is in line with BHK semantics of IPC. Go¨del’s translation ϕ 7→ ϕ′ of IPC
into classical modal logic extends to IEL, where, e.g., the axiom of intuitionistic
co-reflection ϕ→ Kϕ is translated as (ϕ′ → Kϕ′). This is in accordance
with the proposed BHK clause for Kϕ as “a proof of Kϕ is conclusive evidence
of verification that ϕ has a proof” [4], i.e. a proof of Kϕ is a proof of a veri-
fication that ϕ has a proof.3 According to that clause, Kϕ can be read as “it is
verified that ϕ has a proof”. However, as pointed out in [4], IEL also captures
the following possible reading: “it is verified that ϕ holds in some not specified
constructive sense”. We tend to the latter interpretation which seems to better har-
monize with the informal and formal aspects of our approach. Accordingly, we
will propose a weaker BHK clause for epistemic formulas Kϕ, one that is still
2We are inspired by discussions on the hypothetical judgment given in [5, 6].
3We would like to thank the anonymous referee for helpful comments.
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compatible with basic principles of IEL, though is independent of the constraints
imposed by Go¨del translation.
Moreover, we propose in this paper a justification-based interpretation of the
kind of belief and knowledge modeled by our epistemic extensions ofL3–L5 orig-
inally introduced in [15], in contrast to the verification-based approach of IEL
presented in [4]. The agent believes/knows a proposition for some reason or jus-
tification. What the agent recognizes as a reason for her/his belief and knowledge
depends on her/his internal conditions such as reasoning capabilities, experience,
awareness etc. We assume the agent is rational enough to recognize an effected
construction (actual proof) as a justification for belief and knowledge. However,
the agent may be unable to associate the mere possibility of a proof of ϕ, i.e. the
lack of an actual proof of ¬ϕ, with possible belief or knowledge of ϕ. That is,
the mere possibility of a proof is not necessarily accepted as a justification. Un-
der these assumptions, we have to reject intuitionistic co-reflection ϕ → Kϕ as
a valid principle. Instead, its weaker classical version ϕ → Kϕ, proposed in
[15], is valid and ensures that actual proofs yield belief and knowledge. Never-
theless, our justification-based view on belief and knowledge is compatible with
the verification-based one. If the agent accepts possible proofs as justifications for
her/his possible belief and knowledge, then intuitionistic co-reflection ϕ→ Kϕ is
valid and all properties of IEL are restored. In the general case, however, a not per-
fectly rational agent may be unable or unwilling to recognize the mere possibility
of a proof as a justification.
In this sense, the verification-based approach turns out to be a special case of
our justification-based approach. Actually, this is mirrored in our semantic for-
malization which is based on intuitionistic general frames: Both IEL and the epis-
temic extensions of L5 can be modeled and studied within the same framework
of relational semantics. The exact relationship between both approaches now be-
comes explicit. In this framework of relational semantics, our modal version of
co-reflection ϕ → Kϕ is valid. Intuitionistic co-reflection ϕ → Kϕ, how-
ever, corresponds to a semantic condition that must be imposed as an additional
constraint.
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2 An informal model of reasoning
The aim of this section is to informally discuss a model that reflects our intuitions
on (classical) reasoning about actual and possible proof, belief and knowledge.4
A formalization will be given in terms of the S5-style logics and their semantics
presented in subsequent sections. Our purpose here is to illustrate that reasoning
in these S5-style logics harmonizes with (a refined and extended version of) BHK
interpretation. Recall that under standard BHK interpretation,
• a proof of ϕ ∧ ψ consists in a proof of ϕ and a proof of ψ
• a proof of ϕ ∨ ψ consists in a proof of ϕ or a proof of ψ
• a proof of ϕ → ψ consists in a construction that for any proof of ϕ returns
a proof of ψ
• there is no proof of ⊥.
Note that the proof-reading clause for implication involves implicitly the con-
cept of ‘hypothetical proof’ (see, e.g., [5, 6] for discussions). The establishment of
ϕ → ψ, in general, depends on ‘hypothetical constructions’ for ϕ and ψ, respec-
tively. The distinction between actual and hypothetical proof becomes explicit in
our more expressive, classical modal logics where  represents a proof predicate.
In addition to the above example ‘¬¬ϕ versus ¬¬ϕ’, we consider here the
following two formulas:
(3) (ϕ→ ψ) versus ϕ→ ψ.
While the former claims that a construction is established that converts any proof
of ϕ into a proof of ψ, the latter expresses a classical implication: the existence
of an effected construction for ϕ implies the existence of such a construction for
ψ. Of course, the former statement is stronger than the latter. Hypothetical con-
structions are irrelevant in the second statement of (3). That statement cannot be
expressed by a formula in IPC. We explicitly distinguish between the concepts of
actual proof as an effected construction (=intuitionistic truth) and possible proof
as a kind of hypothetical construction. If ϕ has no actual proof, then the second
statement of (3) is true. However, even if ϕ has no actual proof, a proof of ϕ may
4We would like to point out that our modeling does not involve the concept of time or any
dynamic behavior. A given model describes, from its classical point of view, a static situation
regarding actual and possible proof, truth, belief and knowledge.
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be possible and the first statement of (3) may be false (ψ may have no possible
proof). Recall that we say that ϕ has a possible proof (or that a proof of ϕ is
possible) if there is no actual proof of ¬ϕ. Intuitively, a proposition has a possible
proof if it is consistent with the actually proved propositions. In a constructive
sense, we regard a possible proof as a hypothetical construction consistent with
the effected constructions. More precisely, we consider a possible proof as a set
of conditions on a construction in a similar way as suggested by van Atten [5, 6].
Those conditions must not be in conflict with actual proofs. It will be helpful to
view on possible proofs as concrete entities specified in that way.5
Now, we are going to describe our informal model which, unsurprisingly,
builds upon the intuition of Kripke semantics for IPC. We are given a set Φp of
proved propositions, i.e. the propositions which have an actual proof (in this infor-
mal setting, we do not distinguish between formulas and propositions). Of course,
all intuitionistic tautologies have actual proofs and are contained in Φp. Moreover,
since ‘actual proof = intuitionistic truth’, we may think of Φp as a prime theory
of IPC. Φp then represents the root of an intuitionistic Kripke model given by all
prime theories that extend Φp. According to our definition, a formula ϕ has a pos-
sible proof iff ¬ϕ has no actual proof iff ¬ϕ /∈ Φp iff ϕ belongs to some prime
theory extending Φp iff ϕ is contained in some maximal theory extending Φp.
Let us now further suppose that the propositional language contains a predicate
 for actual proof. ϕ reads “there is an actual proof of ϕ”, and ♦ϕ := ¬¬ϕ
reads “there is a possible proof of ϕ”. In order to model classical reasoning about
intuitionistic truth, we choose a designated maximal theory Φm ⊇ Φp. Φm is
the set of classically true propositions of our underlying model of reasoning. The
predicate  for intuitionistic truth (=actual proof) should satisfy the following
basic condition. For any ϕ,
(4) ϕ ∈ Φm ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φp.
That is, ‘ϕ is classically true’ iff ‘ϕ is intuitionistically true’. This biconditional
is formalized in the object language by ϕ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤), see Theorem 3.6 below.
5As argued in [5, 6], the notion of ‘hypothetical construction’ can be avoided if one considers
‘conditions on a construction’ instead of the construction itself: “In order to establish A → B,
one has to conceiveA and B as conditions on constructions, and to show that from the conditions
specified by A one obtains the conditions specified by B, according to transformations whose
composition preserves mathematical constructibility.” [5, 6]. Accordingly, we regard a possible
proof as a set of conditions that are not in conflict with effected constructions, i.e. with proved
propositions. Of course, any actual proof also constitutes a possible proof.
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We show that the following principles now are validated classically, i.e. the
respective formulas belong to Φm:
(A1) (ϕ ∨ ψ) → (ϕ ∨ ψ). (4), together with the fact that Φp is a prime
theory, implies that all instances of (A1) belong to Φm. Note that (A1) is in accor-
dance with the BHK reading of disjunction.
(A2) ϕ → ϕ. “Actual proof implies classical truth.” This follows from (4).
In fact, if ϕ ∈ Φm, then ϕ ∈ Φp ⊆ Φm. Of course, (A2) is also plausible by our
intuition on classical truth and actual proofs as effected constructions.
(K)(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ). This is the principle of distribution for. Of
course, ϕ → ψ ∈ Φp together with ϕ ∈ Φp implies ψ ∈ Φp. Hence, all instances
of (K) belong to Φm.
We expect that those principles are also intuitionistically acceptable. In order
to verify this by means of BHK semantics, we need an appropriate proof-reading
clause for formulas of the form ϕ. We extend the standard BHK interpretation
by the following clause for the proof predicate:
• A proof of ϕ consists in presenting an actual proof of ϕ.
Since ϕ reads “there is an actual proof of ϕ”, the above clause is plausible.
We use the concept of ‘presenting an actual proof’ in an intuitive sense and leave
its concrete meaning open. Nevertheless, we assume that it essentially relies on
a proof-checking procedure in the sense of Artemov [1] where proof-checking is
established as a valid operation on proofs. We also assume that the procedure of
checking a given actual proof s of ϕ depends only on s and ϕ. Then that proce-
dure constitutes itself an actual proof, i.e. an effected construction. Consequently,
by the above clause, a possible proof of ϕ consists in an actual proof (see also
Theorem 3.7 (v) below). It follows that ϕ has an actual proof or a proof of ϕ
is impossible. The latter means that ¬ϕ has an actual proof. Thus:
Either there is an actual proof of ϕ or there is an actual proof of ¬ϕ.
This principle is also established by the following argumentation. Either there
is an actual proof of ϕ (an accessible object) or there is no actual proof of ϕ (in
other words: either ϕ is intuitionistically true or ϕ is not intuitionistically true).
An actual proof of ϕ yields (via proof-checking) an actual proof of ϕ. On the
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other hand, if ϕ has no actual proof, then ϕ cannot have any possible proof (in
fact, a necessary condition on a construction forϕ is that ϕ has an actual proof),
and therefore ¬ϕ = ϕ → ⊥ has an actual proof: we may choose the identity
function as an immediately given effected construction. Standard BHK seman-
tics of disjunction then implies that ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ always has an actual proof, i.e.
(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) is valid (see also Theorem 3.7 (vii) below).
In the following, we list further examples of principles which are validated by
extended BHK interpretation. Recall that we regard a proof of ϕ as an effected
construction that returns a proof-checked actual proof of ϕ.
(A4) ϕ → ϕ. Let t be a proof of ϕ. As argued above, t must be an
actual proof. Then t can be presented (proof-checked) by a procedure u. By def-
inition, u is a proof of ϕ. We have described a construction that converts any
proof t of ϕ into a proof u of ϕ.
(A5) ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ. We describe a construction that for any proof s of ¬ϕ
returns a proof t of ¬ϕ. Let s be a proof of ¬ϕ. Then s is an actual proof
or s is a possible proof. If s is only a possible proof, i.e. a set of conditions on a
construction for ¬ϕ = ϕ → ⊥, then s includes the condition that ϕ has no
proof. By definition, this condition must not be in conflict with actual proofs. By
the discussion above, either ϕ has an actual proof or ¬ϕ has an actual proof.
It follows that ¬ϕ has an actual proof. In any case, s implies the existence of an
actual proof of ¬ϕ = ϕ → ⊥. Then we have a concrete example of such a
proof, namely the identity function as a trivial, immediately given, effected con-
struction. Its presentation (proof-checking) is a procedure t whose construction
depends only on the given data. By definition, t is a proof of ¬ϕ. Finally,
a proof of ¬ϕ → ¬ϕ now is given by the function that for any (actual or
possible) proof s of ¬ϕ returns the procedure t.
Also the principles (A1) and (A2) can be justified by extended BHK interpre-
tation. This is clear for (A1) if one takes into account that an actual proof of ϕ∨ψ
requires, of course, actual proofs of ϕ or of ψ, respectively. Towards (A2), recall
that a proof of ϕ is a procedure that returns a proof-checked actual proof of ϕ.
Then it is evident that there is a construction that for any proof of ϕ returns a
proof of ϕ.
Finally, we not only justify distribution principle (K) but we show that the fol-
lowing stronger principle (A3) of modal logic S3 is intuitionistically acceptable in
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the sense of the extended BHK interpretation. We use here the following notation:
if s is a proof of χ, then we also write s.t instead of s in order to express that s
is a construction that returns the proof-checked actual proof t of χ.
(A3) (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ). Let s.t be a proof of (ϕ → ψ), where
t is an actual proof of ϕ → ψ. We show that t gives rise to an actual proof of
ϕ→ ψ. Let u.v be a proof of ϕ, where v is an actual proof of ϕ. Then t(v)
is an actual proof of ψ and results in a proof r.[t(v)] of ψ. We have described
a function q, s.t 7→ qs.t, that for any proof s.t of (ϕ → ψ) returns a function
qs.t. qs.t converts any proof u.v of ϕ into a proof r.[t(v)] of ψ. Hence, qs.t is
a proof of ϕ → ψ. This shows that (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ) is intuition-
istically acceptable in the sense of extended BHK reading. All involved proofs
are actual proofs. In particular, construction qs.t is an actual proof, and its pre-
sentation (proof-checking) yields a proof p.[qs.t] of (ϕ → ψ). This results
in a construction that converts any proof s.t of (ϕ → ψ) into a proof p.[qs.t] of
(ϕ→ ψ). Thus, (A3) is intuitionistically acceptable, too.
The modal axioms (A1)–(A5) are validated by the extended BHK interpreta-
tion. In this sense, they represent adequate principles for the reasoning about
proof.
However, (A4) and (A5) are not valid in our original model of reasoning. In
order to fix this, we strengthen condition (4) to the following:
ϕ ∈ Φp ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φp
ϕ 6∈ Φp ⇔ ¬ϕ ∈ Φp.
(5)
Note that the biconditionals (4) remain valid. (5) impliesϕ∨¬ϕ ∈ Φp, i.e.
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is intuitionistically true, see Theorem 3.7 (vii) below. Moreover, all
instances of (A1)–(A5) are now intuitionistically true in the updated model. We
show this only for the case of (A4). Let Ψ ⊇ Φp be a prime theory and suppose
ϕ ∈ Ψ. Then by (5), ϕ ∈ Φp and ϕ ∈ Φp ⊆ Ψ. Thus, ϕ→ ϕ ∈ Φp.
(A1)–(A5) represent adequate laws for the reasoning about proof, validated
by extended BHK semantics and by our intuitive model of reasoning. Logic L5
contains the axioms (A1)–(A5) and can be seen as a formalization of that intuitive
reasoning. L5 is (strongly) sound and complete w.r.t. a semantics of algebraic
models that essentially correspond to our intuitive model of reasoning. More-
over, we will prove soundess and completeness of L5 w.r.t. a relational semantics
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based on intuitionistic general frames, i.e. a formal counterpart of informal BHK
interpretation. In this sense, L5 is an adequate and complete modal logic for the
classical reasoning about proof as intuitionistic truth.
Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic (IEL) relies on the assumption that belief and
knowledge are products of verification, where verification is intuitively under-
stood as “evidence considered sufficiently conclusive for practical purposes” [4].
Proof, as “the most strict kind of verification”, then yields verification-based be-
lief and knowledge. This is expressed by the axiom of intuitionistic co-reflection
ϕ → Kϕ. On the other hand, known propositions cannot be proved to be false.
This is the principle of intuitionistic reflection, axiomatized by Kϕ → ¬¬ϕ.
In the intuitionistic setting, those epistemic principles are in accordance with
the BHK interpretation of IPC. Under the classical reading, however, they im-
ply equivalence between knowledge and classical truth: Kϕ ↔ ϕ. The ques-
tion arises in which way our classical modal logics L3–L5 can be extended by
epistemic axioms such that intuitive principles of IEL are preserved or mirrored
in some adequate way, and the metalogical implications intuitionistic truth ⇒
knowledge ⇒ classical truth remain strict. We presented such epistemic exten-
sions of L3–L5 in [15] and proved completeness w.r.t. algebraic semantics. In a
conceptual sense, however, it remained open which kind of belief and knowledge
is described by those logics. We propose here a justification-based interpretation
of belief and knowledge as a generalization of the verification-based approach
to intuitionistic belief and knowledge given in [4]. A proposition is believed or
known for a given reason or justification.6 What the agent accepts as a justifica-
tion or reason is determined by her/his internal state. In any case, the agent should
accept effected constructions as justifications, and justifications should be closed
under Modus Ponens (otherwise, the agent would be too irrational). However, the
agent may have very little confidence in possible proofs, and a proposition that has
only a possible proof may appear unbelievable to the agent. Possible proofs are
not necessarily recognized as justifications for (possible) belief and knowledge,
intuitionistic co-reflection is not valid. However, if the agent recognizes possible
proofs as justifications, then intuitionistic co-reflection is restored. In this sense,
our justification-based view on belief and knowledge can be seen as a generaliza-
tion of the verification-based approach of IEL presented in [4].
In the verification-based approach, intuitionistic belief and knowledge are un-
6Actually, this is the view on epistemic concepts that underlies certain Justification Logics, see
[3] for an overview.
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derstood as ‘products of verification’. Analogously, we consider here the follow-
ing clause for a constructive reading ofKϕ:
• A proof ofKϕ is the product of an epistemic justification of ϕ.
Thus, Kϕ can be read intuitionistically as “ϕ has an epistemic justification”.
We do not further specify here the intuitive concept of epistemic justification.
However, we assume that every actual proof constitutes an epistemic justification,
and epistemic justifications are closed under Modus Ponens (this enables us to
model justification sets as filters of a Heyting algebra).
Let us see how the proof-reading clause forKϕ together with the assumptions
on epistemic justifications can be incorporated into our intuitive model of reason-
ing. The proof-reading clause is modeled by a correspondence between (possible
or actual) proofs of Kϕ and epistemic justifications of ϕ. For this purpose, we
assume the existence of a function E that assigns to each prime theory Ψ ⊇ Φp a
set of propositionsE(Ψ) such that Φp ⊆ E(Ψ) and E(Ψ) ‘is closed under Modus
Ponens’ (these conditions will ensure that E(Ψ) corresponds to a filter, i.e. is a
‘theory of propositions’), and for all ϕ holds:
Kϕ ∈ Ψ⇔ ϕ ∈ E(Ψ).
If ϕ ∈ E(Ψ), then we say that ϕ has an epistemic justification w.r.t. Ψ. We refer
to E(Ψ) as the justification set of Ψ.
The conditions imposed on functionE ensure that the extended intuitivemodel
now validates the following epistemic principles:
(KBel) The distribution axiom K(ϕ → ψ) → (Kϕ → Kψ) holds intuition-
istically. In order to see this, it is enough to show that Kϕ → Kψ belongs to a
prime theory Ψ whenever K(ϕ → ψ) belongs to Ψ. This follows from the prop-
erties ofE. The formalized statement is shown in the proof of Theorem 4.6 below.
Every actual proof is recognized by the agent as an epistemic justification.
Possible proofs, however, are in general too weak to be considered as justifica-
tions.
In fact, by properties of function E, we have in particular Φp ⊆ E(Φp). So if ϕ
has an actual proof, i.e. ϕ ∈ Φp, then ϕ ∈ E(Φp) and ϕ has a justification w.r.t.
Φp. On the other hand, Ψ ⊆ E(Ψ) does not hold in general for arbitrary prime
theories Ψ ⊇ Φp.
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(CoRe) The modal version of co-reflection, ϕ → Kϕ, is intuitionistically
validated by our model of reasoning.
Let Ψ ⊇ Φp be a prime theory and suppose ϕ ∈ Ψ. Since (A4) is intuitionis-
tically valid in our model, we get ϕ ∈ Ψ. By condition (5) above, ϕ ∈ Φp
and ϕ ∈ Φp. By properties of function E, Φp ⊆ E(Φp). Thus, ϕ ∈ E(Φp) and
thereforeKϕ ∈ Φp and Kϕ ∈ Φp ⊆ Ψ. Thus, ϕ→ Kϕ ∈ Φp.
Intuitionistic reflection (IntRe), Kϕ → ¬¬ϕ, is intuitionistically valid in our
model iff the following holds: For any prime theory Ψ, the justification set E(Ψ)
is contained in every maximal theory that extends Ψ.
This follows readily from properties of our model (see the proof of Theorem 4.6
for a formalization). (IntRe) implies in particular that every justification set is
consistent, i.e. contained in some maximal theory (‘knowable propositions can-
not be intuitionistically false’), and the justification set E(Φp) is contained in the
maximal theory Φm (‘intuitionistically known propositions are classically true’).
We have shown that, additionally to (A1)–(A5), also the postulated epistemic
principles are intuitionistically valid in our informal model of reasoning (where
the validity of (IntRe) depends on additional semantic constraints). These are the
principles of reasoning underlying our S5-style epistemic modal logics presented
below.
Finally, we would like to mention that (CoRe) ϕ → Kϕ is also validated
by the extended BHK interpretation. Let s.t be a proof ofϕ, where t is an actual
proof of ϕ. Then, as an actual proof, t is recognized as an epistemic justification
for ϕ. By the proof-reading clause forKϕ, t yields a proof u ofKϕ. Since t is an
actual proof, we may assume that u is an actual proof, too. Proof-checking yields
a proof v.u of Kϕ. We have described a construction that for any proof of ϕ
returns a proof of Kϕ.
The original axiom of intuitionistic co-reflection ϕ→ Kϕ is the only principle
from IEL that is not validated by our informal model. That axiom corresponds to
the semantic condition
(6) Ψ ⊆ E(Ψ), for all prime theories Ψ ⊇ Φp.
(6) expresses that every (possible or actual) proof yields a justification. This is
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obviously stronger than
(7) Ψp ⊆ E(Ψp).
Indeed, (7) only expresses that actual proofs yield justifications. The comparison
‘(6) versus (7)’ reveals semantically the difference between the verification-based
approach of IEL and our justification-based approach. If we would impose the
stronger condition (6) as a semantic constraint on our model of reasoning, then all
epistemic principles of IEL would be intuitionistically true.
3 Axiomatization and Algebraic Semantics
The object language is inductively defined over an infinite set of variables x0, x1,
... , logical connectives∧, ∨,→,⊥, the modal operator and the epistemic opera-
torK. Fm is the set of all formulas, and Fm0 ⊆ Fm is the set of all propositional
formulas, i.e. those formulas of Fm that contain neither the modal operator nor
the epistemic operator K. Finally, Fm1 ⊆ Fm is the modal propositional lan-
guage given by all formulas without epistemic operator K. We use the notation
ϕ[x := ψ] to denote the formula that results from ϕ by substituting simultaneously
all occurrences of variable x with formula ψ (this is defined by induction on ϕ).
Furthermore, we shall use the following abbreviations:
¬ϕ := ϕ→ ⊥
⊤ := ¬⊥
ϕ↔ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)
ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ↔ ψ) (“propositional identity = strict equivalence”)
Φ := {ψ | ψ ∈ Φ}, for Φ ⊆ Fm
♦ϕ := ¬¬ϕ
We consider the following list of Axiom Schemes
(INT) all theorems of IPC and their substitution-instances7
(A1) (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ϕ ∨ψ) (disjunction property)
(A2) ϕ→ ϕ
(A3) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
7A substitution-instance of ϕ is the result of uniformly replacing variables in ϕ by formulas of
Fm.
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(A4) ϕ→ ϕ
(A5) ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ
(KBel)K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ) (distribution of belief)
(CoRe) ϕ→ Kϕ (co-reflection)
(IntRe)Kϕ→ ¬¬ϕ (intuitionistic reflection)
(E4)Kϕ→ KKϕ (positive introspection)
(E5) ¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ (negative introspection)
(PNB) Kϕ→ Kϕ (positive necessitation of belief)
(NNB) ¬Kϕ→ ¬Kϕ (negative necessitation of belief)
and the following Theorem Scheme (TND) of tertium non datur
(TND) ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
Our inference rules are Modus Ponens MP “From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ”, and
Axiom Necessitation AN “If ϕ is an axiom, then infer ϕ”. Note that rule AN
applies only to the axioms of a given system but not to the theorems; in particular,
AN does not apply to the theorems of the form (TND).
On this basis, we define a hierarchy of deductive systems. We shall see that in
the context of our S5-style logics, i.e. those systems of our hierarchy containing
(A4) and (A5), the axiomatization can be slightly simplified, see Corollary 3.3
and Theorem 3.8 (vii). For instance, (A3) can be replaced with the usual distribu-
tion law, and (CoRe) can be replaced with the simpler scheme ϕ → Kϕ. The
epistemic axioms (E4), (E5), (PNB), (NNB) seem to have no plausible validation
under the extended BHK interpretation (epistemic justifications are, in general,
not strong enough to warrant (E4) and (E5)). We regard those axioms as addi-
tional epistemic laws that go beyond the established BHK validated principles.
Moreover, we shall see that modulo the modal axioms of S5, (NNB) derives from
(PNB), see Theorem 3.8 (vii).
Our deductive systems are based on principles of Lewis modal logics. Recall
that the systems S1–S3 were originally proposed by C. I. Lewis as formalizations
of the concept of strict implication (ϕ → ψ) (see, e.g., [9] for a discussion). In
the language of propositional modal logic Fm1, Lewis system S1 can be axiom-
atized in the following way (on a basis due to E. J. Lemmon). The axioms are
given by all classical tautologies along with their substitution-instances + axiom
(A2) + the following transitivity axiom
(8) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ)).
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As inference rules we have MP, AN and the rule of Substitution of Proved Strict
Equivalents SPSE “From ϕ ≡ ψ infer χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ]”.
In [12, 13, 14], we proposed to interpret strict equivalence (ϕ ↔ ψ) as
propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ. That is, we considered Lewis-style modal logics
where strict equivalence (ϕ ≡ ψ) := (ϕ ↔ ψ) satisfies the following identity
axioms:
(Id1) (ϕ ≡ ϕ)
(Id2) (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ↔ ψ)
(Id3) (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ])
These axioms come from Suszko’s non-Fregean logicswhere the identity con-
nective≡ is given as a primitive symbol of the language (see, e.g, [7]). If the sym-
bol ≡ is defined as strict equivalence, then (Id1) and (Id2) are obviously satisfied
in system S1. We refer to axiom (Id3) as the Substitution Principle SP. Obviously,
SP is stronger than inference rule SPSE of S1. We showed in [12] that S1+SP, i.e.
the system that results from S1 by adding all formulas of the form SP as theorems,
has a natural algebraic semantics that extends straightforwardly to semantics for
S3–S5. Recall that Lewis system S3 results from S1 by adding (A3) as axiom
scheme (see [9]). It turns out that S3 is the weakest Lewis modal system where
strict equivalence not only satisfies (Id1) and (Id2) but also (Id3) (see [12, 14]).
Thus, we have ‘strict equivalence = propositional identity’ in S3, a condition that
also holds in the modal systems studied in the present paper. As a consequence,
we may adopt the style of non-Fregean semantics presented in [12]. Now, let us
define the modal logics that are relevant for the present research.
• The weakest system in our hierarchy is logic L, formalized in the proposi-
tional modal language Fm1. L is given by the axiom schemes (INT), (A1),
(A2) and (8). All formulas of the form (TND) and SP (i.e. (Id3)) are added
as theorems. The inference rules are MP and AN. (Recall that AN applies
only to axioms of the given system.)
• Modal system L3 is given by the axiom schemes (INT), (A1), (A2), (A3),
theorem scheme (TND) and the rules of MP and AN. L4 results from L3 by
adding (A4) as axiom scheme, and L5 results from L4 by adding (A5) as
axiom scheme.
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• Now, we consider the full language Fm and define epistemic and modal
extensions of L3 by adding further axiom schemes:
– EL3− = L3 + (KBel) + (CoRe)
– EL4− = EL3− + (A4) = L4 + (KBel) + (CoRe)
– EL5− = EL4− + (A5) = L5 + (KBel) + (CoRe)
– E4Ln− = ELn− + (E4), n ∈ {3, 4, 5}
– E5Ln− = E4Ln− + (E5), n ∈ {3, 4, 5}
– E6Ln− = ELn− + (PNB) + (NNB), n ∈ {3, 4, 5}
– ELn = ELn− + (IntRe), n ∈ {3, 4, 5}
– EkLn = EkLn− + (IntRe), k ∈ {4, 5, 6} and n ∈ {3, 4, 5}.
Systems containing scheme (IntRe) are regarded as logics of knowledge
while systems without that scheme are regarded as logics of belief.
Observe that the notation is organized in the following way. In ELn−, ELn,
and in EkLn−, EkLn (k = 4, 5; n = 3, 4, 5), the index n refers to extensions
by corresponding modal laws from S3, S4, S5, respectively, whereas the index
k refers to corresponding epistemic extensions. Exceptions from that rule are
E6Ln− and E6Ln, where n still refers to the corresponding modal extension,
and number 6 is chosen here to indicate the addition of the two bridge axioms
(PNB) and (NNB) to ELn− and ELn, respectively.
The notion of derivation is defined in the usual way: Suppose L is one of our
modal systems and Φ ∪ {ϕ} is a subset of the corresponding object language:
Fm1 or Fm. We say that ϕ is derivable from Φ in L, notation: Φ ⊢L ϕ, if there is
a finite sequence ϕ1, ..., ϕm = ϕ such that for each ϕi (i = 1, ..., m), either is ϕi
an axiom of L or ϕi ∈ Φ or ϕi is of the form (TND) or there is an axiom ψ of L
such that ϕi = ψ (application of AN) or there are formulas ϕj , ϕk = ϕj → ϕi
occurring in the sequence, where j, k < i (application of MP).
System L was originally introduced in [13] as a minimal modal logic satisfy-
ing the condition ‘strict equivalence = propositional identity’ and combining clas-
sical and intuitionistic propositional logic in the following sense: L is a conserva-
tive extension of CPC and for any set of propositional formulas Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm0
it holds that
(9) Φ ⊢IPC ϕ ⇔ Φ ⊢L ϕ.
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The stronger logic L3, first considered in [15], inherits these properties and
distinguishes explicitly between intuitionistic and classical principles: while all
axioms are supposed to be intuitionistically acceptable, the unique theorem scheme
of tertium non datur (TND) represents a classical law. The S3 principle (A3), con-
tained in L3 as an axiom, ensures that all instances of SP are derivable. Actually,
one can show a stronger fact: all instances of SP prefixed by  are derivable, i.e.
L3 contains SP (see [12] for a proof where it is shown that S3 contains SP).
Obviously, we get the following hierarchy: L ⊆ L3 ⊆ L4 ⊆ L5.
The systemsEL3− andEL3–EL5were introduced in [15] as epistemic/modal
extensions of L3. These classical systems seem to reflect in a sense the basic prin-
ciples of Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic introduced in [4]. The precise relationship
between the S5-style modal systems of our hierarchy (i.e. those containing L5)
and Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic will become explicit by means of the uniform
framework of relational semantics presented below.
Lemma 3.1. Our logics of belief form the following hierarchies:
• EL3− ⊆ EL4− ⊆ EL5−
• ELn− ⊆ E4Ln− ⊆ E5Ln− ⊆ E6Ln−, for n = 3, 4, 5
• EkL3− ⊆ EkL4− ⊆ EkL5−, for k = 4, 5, 6.
Corresponding hierarchies hold for our logics of knowledge.
Proof. Most of the inclusions follow immediately from the definitions. It remains
to prove E5Ln− ⊆ E6Ln−, for n = 3, 4, 5. It is enough to show that (Kϕ →
KKϕ) and (¬Kϕ → K¬Kϕ) are theorems of E6Ln−. Observe that Kϕ →
Kϕ is an instance of (PNB), Kϕ → KKϕ is an instance of (CoRe), and
KKϕ → KKϕ is an instance of (A2). Then rule AN along with transitivity
axiom (8) and rule MP yields (Kϕ → KKϕ). On the other hand, ¬Kϕ →
¬Kϕ is an instance of (NNB), ¬Kϕ → K¬Kϕ is an instance of (CoRe)
and K¬Kϕ → K¬Kϕ is an instance of (A2). In the same way as before, we
derive (¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ).
The full Necessitation Rule of normal modal logics is, in general, not applica-
ble in our systems. However, the rule is valid in the ‘intuitionistic parts’ of logics
containing (A4) according to the following result.
Lemma 3.2. Let L be a logic of our hierarchy containing axiom scheme (A4). If
ϕ is a theorem of L derivable without (TND), then ϕ is a theorem of L.
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Proof. This is an induction on the length of a derivation. If axioms occur in the
derivation, then apply AN. If rule MP occurs, then apply the induction hypothesis
and the modal distribution law. If some formula ψ in the derivation is obtained by
rule AN, i.e. ψ = χ, for some axiom χ, then we derive ψ by applying (A4)
and rule MP.
Logics with axiom scheme (A4) can be axiomatized in a slightly simpler way:
Corollary 3.3. Let L be a logic of our hierarchy containing (A4). Replacing
the axiom schemes (A3) and co-reflection (CoRe) with the usual distribution law
(ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ) and the weaker version ϕ → Kϕ of (CoRe),
respectively, results in a system which is deductively equivalent with L.
Proof. It is clear that those obviously weaker principles are theorems of L. By
Lemma 3.2, we also derive ((ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ)) and (ϕ → Kϕ)
(alternatively, we may derive these formulas applying the S1 transitivity principle
(8) above). The other way round, we now suppose (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ)
and ϕ → Kϕ are given as axioms and show that (A3) and (CoRe), prefixed by
, are derivable, provided (A4) is available. Rule AN yields (ϕ → Kϕ), and
distribution along with MP yields ϕ → Kϕ. Then, by (A4) ϕ → ϕ
and transitivity of implication, we get (CoRe). On the other hand, AN applied
to the distribution axiom, along with distribution itself and MP yields (ϕ →
ψ) → (ϕ → ψ). By (A4) in the form of (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ) along
with transitivity of implication, we get (A3). Now, by the proof of Lemma 3.2,
we also derive the respective formulas prefixed by , i.e. (ϕ → Kϕ) and
((ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)).
Next, we present some properties shared by all our modal logics.
Lemma 3.4. [12, 15] The Substitution Principle SP, i.e. axiom (Id3), is valid
in all our modal logics, even in the extended epistemic language. Consequently,
(Id1)–(Id3) are satisfied and we have ‘propositional identity = strict equivalence’
in all our modal logics.
Proof. Of course, SP holds in L where it is explicitly stated as a theorem scheme
of the deductive system. SP involves the notion of a substitution ϕ[x := ψ] which
is defined in the canonical way by induction on the complexity of formula ϕ. This
means in particular that the validity of SP depends on the underlying language.
We showed in [12] that in the language of modal logic, all instances of SP are
theorems of S3. By the same arguments given there, SP is also valid in L3. In
19
[15], we showed that SP is also valid in EL3−, a logic defined over the extended
epistemic language. Then SP also holds in all extensions of EL3− which are
defined over same language.
A certain substitution or replacement principle of CPC says that if two formu-
las ϕ, ψ are logically equivalent, then replacing an occurrence of ϕ with ψ in a
formula χ results in a formula which is logically equivalent to χ. It is well-known
that that principle is also valid in normal modal logics. It fails, however, in our
modal logics which are of higher ‘intensional degree’ than current classical modal
logics in the sense that more propositions can be distinguished: classically equiv-
alent formulas such as ϕ and ¬¬ϕ denote the same proposition in any model of
normal modal logic (in fact, (ϕ ↔ ¬¬ϕ) is a theorem), though such formu-
las generally denote distinct propositions in models of L (only intuitionistically
equivalent formulas have always the same denotation). Actually, we are working
with non-Fregean logics: the Fregean Axiom (ϕ ↔ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ), “Formulas
with the same truth value have the same meaning”, is invalid.8
Lemma 3.5. Let L be one of our modal logics. Then
⊢L ϕ↔ ψ does not generally imply ⊢L χ[x := ϕ]↔ χ[x := ψ].
Proof. We anticipate here the fact that our logics are sound and complete w.r.t.
the kind of algebraic semantics considered in [15]. Towards a counterexample,
we consider the model constructed in the proof of [Theorem 4.4, [15]] which is
a model of EL5 based on the linearly ordered Heyting algebra of the interval of
reals [0, 1]with ultrafilter (0, 1]. One easily recognizes that this is actually a model
of E6L5, i.e. a model of all our modal logics. Of course, the formula y ↔ ¬¬y is
a classical tautology and therefore valid in our classical modal logics. y and ¬¬y
have always the same classical truth value. However, these formulas may denote
distinct propositions in some model of our non-Fregean logics. For instance, in
the considered model, one finds an element m 6= 1 such that the double negation
of m equals 1. In fact, every m ∈ (0, 1) has this property. So if the variable y
denotes such an m, then y denotes 0 and ¬¬y denotes 1. Then that model
together with ϕ = y, ψ = ¬¬y and χ = x represents a counterexample.
By [Lemma 2.3, [12]], all biconditionals of the formϕ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤) are valid
in system S1+SP. We outline here a simpler proof of that fact.
8Lewis modal logics S3–S5 are examples of current modal systems that can be studied as
non-Fregean logics (see, e.g., [12, 14]).
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Theorem 3.6. All biconditionals of the form
(10) ϕ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤)
are theorems of our modal logics.
Proof. Of course, ϕ → ⊤ is a theorem of IPC. AN then yields (ϕ → ⊤). On
the other hand, ϕ → (⊤ → ϕ) is the substitution-instance of a theorem of IPC
and AN yields (ϕ → (⊤ → ϕ)). Applying distribution and MP, we get ϕ →
(⊤ → ϕ). Hence, ϕ → ((ϕ → ⊤) ∧ (⊤ → ϕ)), i.e. ϕ → (ϕ ≡ ⊤) is
derivable. The other way round, (ϕ ≡ ⊤) implies in particular (⊤ → ϕ). By
distribution and MP,⊤ → ϕ. ⊤ is a theorem of IPC. Hence, AN and MP yield
ϕ. This shows that (ϕ ≡ ⊤)→ ϕ is derivable.
Suppose ≡ is a primitive symbol of the language such that the axioms (Id1)–
(Id3) of propositional identity are satisfied. Under this assumption, we called the
scheme (ϕ ∧ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ) the Collapse Axiom in [14]. It implies that there
is exactly one necessary proposition, namely the proposition denoted by ⊤. This
is also expressed by scheme (10) above, where ≡ is defined as strict equivalence.
However, we cannot expect that strict equivalence is propositional identity in any
modal system. For instance, axiom (Id2) is not fulfilled in normal modal logicK,
and (Id3) does not hold in Lewis systems S1 and S2 (see [14, 12]). Nevertheless,
the relation of propositional identity refines the relation of strict equivalence.9 The
Collapse Axiom is valid whenever both relations coincide. The logics S3–S5 as
well as our modal logics are all strong enough to ensure that strict equivalence is
propositional identity axiomatized by (Id1)–(Id3).
Thus, (10) says that there is exactly one necessary proposition, denoted by ⊤. In
our modal logics, this is ‘the intuitionistically true proposition’. Then (10) reads
“ϕ iff ϕ holds intuitionistically”.
Under this interpretation, (10) recalls the Tarski biconditionals (also called Con-
vention T or T-scheme) of Tarski’s truth theory. In our setting, operator  is a
predicate for intuitionistic truth and belongs to the object language.10 In fact, it
9We show that ϕ ≡ ψ refines strict equivalence (ϕ ↔ ψ). By (Id3), (ϕ ≡ ψ) → ((ϕ ↔
x))[x := ϕ] ≡ ((ϕ↔ x))[x := ψ]). Thus, (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ ((ϕ↔ ϕ) ≡ (ϕ↔ ψ)). This along
with (Id2) yields (ϕ ≡ ψ) → ((ϕ ↔ ϕ) → (ϕ ↔ ψ)). Since (ϕ ↔ ϕ) is a theorem, also
(ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ↔ ψ) is a theorem.
10Note, however, that the expression ϕ ≡ ⊤ is defined in terms of , i.e. the truth predicate
appears on both sides of the biconditional (10). This could be possibly avoided by introducing the
identity connective as a primitive symbol along with a suitable additional axiomatization.
21
will follow from the definition of our model-theoretic semantics, which is based
on Heyting algebras, that ϕ is satisfied (i.e. classically true) in a given model iff
ϕ denotes the top element of the underlying Heyting lattice (i.e. ϕ is intuitionisti-
cally true in the model).
In the following, we present a few examples of derivable principles.
Theorem 3.7.
(i) ⊢L ¬♦⊥. “A proof of ⊥ is impossible (⊥ has no possible proof).” “The set
of proved propositions is consistent”.
(ii) ⊢L ϕ→ ♦ϕ. “Classical truth implies the possibility of a proof.”
(iii) ⊢L ϕ→ ♦ϕ. “If ϕ has an actual proof, then ϕ has a possible proof.”
(iv) ⊢L4 ¬♦⊥. “There is an actual proof that a proof of ⊥ is impossible.”
“There is an actual proof that the given set of proved propositions is con-
sistent.”
(v) ⊢L5 ♦ϕ → ϕ. “If ϕ has a possible proof, then ϕ has an actual
proof.”
(vi) ⊢L5 ♦¬ϕ → ¬ϕ. “If ¬ϕ has a possible proof, then it has an actual
proof.”
(vii) ⊢L5 (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ). “There exists an actual proof of the fact that either
there is an actual proof of ϕ or there is no such proof of ϕ.”
Proof. (i): Formula ¬⊥ = ⊥ → ⊥ is an intuitionistic tautology. By AN, ¬⊥
is a theorem. Also ¬⊥ → ¬¬¬⊥ is a theorem (a substitution-instance of the
intuitionistic tautology x→ ¬¬x). By MP, we derive ¬¬¬⊥ = ¬♦⊥.
(ii): By (A2), ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ. Apply contraposition.
(iii): Consider (A2), item (ii) and transitivity of implication.
(iv): Note that (TND) does not occur in the derivation given in (i). Thus, by
Lemma 3.2, ¬♦⊥ is a theorem of L4.
(v): ♦ϕ → ϕ is the contrapositive of (A5). This together with (A4) and
transitivity of implication yields ♦ϕ→ ϕ.
(vi): ϕ → ¬¬ϕ is the substitution-instance of a theorem of IPC. Rule AN,
distribution and MP yield ϕ → ¬¬ϕ. Then by (A4) and transitivity of
implication, ϕ → ¬¬ϕ. The contrapositive is ♦¬ϕ → ¬ϕ. Finally,
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♦¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ by (A5) and transitivity of implication.
(vii): χ→ (χ ∨ ψ) is an axiom. By AN and distribution,
χ→ (χ ∨ ψ)
is a theorem scheme of which ϕ → (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) is an instance. Axiom
(A4) along with transitivity of implication then yields ϕ → (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ).
¬ϕ→ (¬ϕ∨ϕ) is a further instance of the theorem scheme above. This,
together with (A5), yields¬ϕ→ (¬ϕ∨ϕ). Since (χ∨¬χ) ≡ (¬χ∨χ) is a
theorem, (χ∨¬χ) and (¬χ∨χ) are interchangeable in every context (Substitution
Principle). Thus,
ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) and ¬ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ).
are theorems. Consequently, (ϕ∨¬ϕ) → (ϕ∨¬ϕ) is a theorem. Tertium
non datur along with MP then yields the assertion.
Intuitively, Kϕ has a possible proof, notation: ♦Kϕ, if and only if classical
truth of Kϕ is possible. If Kϕ is classically true, then ϕ denotes a believed (a
known) proposition. In this sense, we may read ♦Kϕ as “ϕ is believable (know-
able)”. We now list some examples of derivable (non-derivable) epistemic princi-
ples. Some of these examples are given in similar form in [Theorem 2.5, [15]].
Theorem 3.8.
(i) ⊢EL3− Kϕ→ ♦Kϕ. “Believed (known) propositions are believable (know-
able), respectively.”
(ii) ⊢EL4− ϕ → Kϕ. “If ϕ has an actual proof, then there is an actual
proof that it is believed (known) that ϕ has an actual proof.”
(iii) ⊢EL5− ¬ϕ→ K¬ϕ. “If ϕ has no actual proof, then there is an actual
proof that it is believed (known) that ϕ has no actual proof.”
(iv) ⊢EL5− Kϕ ∨K¬ϕ. “Either it is believed (known) that ϕ has an actual
proof or it is believed (known) that ϕ has no such proof, respectively.”
(v) ⊢E6L3− ♦Kϕ→ Kϕ. “All believable (knowable) propositions are believed
(known), respectively.”
(vi) 0E6L5 ϕ→ ♦Kϕ. “There may exist true propositions that are unknowable
(unbelievable).”
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(vii) ⊢EL5− (Kϕ → Kϕ) → (¬Kϕ → ¬Kϕ). “Modulo EL5
−, axiom
scheme (NNB) follows from (PNB).”
Proof. (i): This is a particular case of item (ii) of the preceding Theorem.
(ii): ϕ → ϕ and ϕ → Kϕ are axioms of EL4−. The assertion fol-
lows by transitivity of implication.
(iii): ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ and ¬ϕ → K¬ϕ are axioms of EL5−. Apply tran-
sitivity of implication.
(iv): This is shown in [Theorem 2.6, [15]].
(v): This is the contrapositive of axiom (NNB).
(vi): Again, we anticipate algebraic semantics given below and prove the assertion
by presenting an E6L5-model where ϕ denotes a true and ♦Kϕ denotes a false
proposition. Such a model should contain a propositionm such thatm is true and
unknown. If variable x denotes m, the model then satisfies x and ¬Kx. Since
the model validates axiom (NNB), ¬Kx is true, i.e. ♦Kx is false. In the proof
of [Theorem 4.4, [15]], a specific model of logic EL5 is constructed. One easily
checks that that model is a model of logic E6L5 (in the sense of the semantics
presented below) and has the desired properties.
(vii): By (PNB), (A2) and rule AN, we have Kϕ ≡ Kϕ. Then by SP, the
formulas Kϕ and Kϕ can be replaced by each other in every context. In par-
ticular, ¬Kϕ → ¬Kϕ is a theorem. By (A5), ¬Kϕ → ¬Kϕ is a the-
orem. Replacing in this formula the last occurrence of Kϕ with Kϕ, we get
¬Kϕ→ ¬Kϕ. Transitivity of implication yields ¬Kϕ→ ¬Kϕ.
Note that item (ii) of Theorem 3.8 is related to the axiom of intuitionistic co-
reflection ϕ→ Kϕ of IEL. The classical version of that axiom under Go¨del trans-
lation “box every subformula” is (ϕ′ → Kϕ′), where ϕ′ is the translation
of ϕ. By Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 3.8 (ii), (ϕ → Kϕ) is a theorem of
EL4−. That is, the classical interpretation of intuitionistic co-reflection, based on
Go¨del translation, is similar to a theorem of EL4−. However, our modal version
of co-reflection, axiom (CoRe) ϕ→ Kϕ, is strictly weaker than intuitionistic
co-reflection as the uniform framework of relational semantics below will reveal.
IPC is contained in our classical modal logics, though IEL is not. In the last sec-
tion, we will present an extension of EL5 that contains IEL in a similar way as L
contains IPC.
Our standard semantics is based on the model-theoretic, algebraic semantics
introduced in [13, 15], where models are given as Heyting algebras with a desig-
nated ultrafilter and some additional structure. Before presenting the details, we
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list some basic facts about Heyting algebras (Heyting lattices). Recall that a filter
of a lattice (M,≤) is a non-empty subset F ⊆ M such that the following two
conditions are satisfied for all m,m′ ∈ M : if m,m′ ∈ F , then f∧(m,m
′) ∈ F ;
if m ∈ F and m ≤ m′, then m′ ∈ F . A filter is said to be proper if it does not
contain all elements of the underlying lattice. An ultrafilter is a maximal proper
filter; a proper filter F is said to be prime if f∨(m,m
′) ∈ F implies [m ∈ F or
m′ ∈ F ]. Note that we use symbols of the form f∨, f∧, f→ etc. to refer in an
intuitive way to lattice operations such as join, meet, relative pseudo-complement
etc.
Lemma 3.9. Let H be a Heyting algebra with universe H .
(a) U ⊆ H is an ultrafilter iff there is a Heyting algebra homomorphism h fromH
to the two-element Boolean algebra B such that the top element of B is precisely
the image of U under h.
(b) If U ⊆ H is an ultrafilter, then for allm,m′ ∈ H:
• f∨(m,m
′) ∈ U iffm ∈ U orm′ ∈ U (i.e. U is a prime filter)
• m ∈ U or f¬(m) ∈ U
• f→(m,m
′) ∈ U iff [m /∈ U orm′ ∈ U] iff f∨(f¬(m), m
′) ∈ U .
(c) Every proper filter is the intersection of all prime filters containing it.
(d) Let m1, m2 ∈ H and let P be a prime filter. Then we have f→(m1, m2) ∈ P
if, and only if, for all prime filters P ′ ⊇ P ,m1 ∈ P
′ impliesm2 ∈ P
′.
Proof. (a)–(d) are known properties of Heyting algebras which are not hard to
prove. The right-to-left implication of (d), however, might be less familiar. We
outline a proof. Let P be a prime filter. We consider the quotient Heyting
algebra H′ of H modulo P . That is, the elements of H′ are the equivalence
classes m of m ∈ M modulo the equivalence relation ∼ defined by m ∼ m′ ⇔
[f→(m,m
′) ∈ P and f→(m
′, m) ∈ P ]. Then one easily checks that P is the
equivalence class of f⊤ modulo∼, and it is the top element f
′
⊤
ofH′.
Claim1: Letm,m′ ∈ H . Ifm ∈ F ′ impliesm′ ∈ F ′, for all filters F ′ of H′, then
m ≤′ m′, where ≤′ is the lattice order ofH′.
Proof of Claim1. Suppose m 
′ m′. Consider the filter G = {m′′ | m ≤′ m′′}.
Thenm ∈ G andm′ /∈ G. We have proved the Claim.
Claim2: Let m,m′ ∈ H . If m ∈ F ′ implies m′ ∈ F ′, for all prime filters F ′ of
H′, thenm ≤′ m′, where ≤′ is the lattice ordering ofH′.
Proof of Claim2. Claim2 follows from Claim1 together with (c).
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Claim3: If F ′ is a (prime) filter ofH′, then F = {m | m ∈ F ′} is a (prime) filter
ofH extending P .
Proof of Claim3. Suppose m ∈ F and m ≤ m′. Then f→(m,m
′) = f⊤. Thus,
f→(m,m′) = P = f
′
⊤
. That is, f ′
→
(m,m′) = f ′
⊤
and therefore m ≤′ m′. It
follows thatm′ ∈ F ′ andm′ ∈ F . The remaining filter properties follow straight-
forwardly. m ∈ P impliesm = P = f ′
⊤
∈ F ′ impliesm ∈ F . Thus, P ⊆ F and
Claim3 holds true.
Now let m1, m2 be elements of H such that for all prime filters F ⊇ P , m1 ∈ F
implies m2 ∈ F . We show that this implies f→(m1, m2) ∈ P . Let m1 ∈ F
′ for
some prime filter F ′ of H′. Then, by Claim3, m1 ∈ F = {m | m ∈ F
′} and F
is a prime filter of H with P ⊆ F . By hypothesis, m2 ∈ F . Thus, m2 ∈ F
′. By
Claim2,m1 ≤
′ m2. Then f→(m1, m2) = f
′
⊤
= P . That is, f→(m1, m2) ∈ P .
For further details about Heyting algebras (sometimes called pseudo-Boolean
algebras) we refer the reader to [8].
We would like to point out that dropping the epistemic ingredients of the fol-
lowing model definitions results in models for the logics L3–L5, i.e. an EL3−-
model becomes a L3-model, etc. Since these transitions are trivial, we only con-
sider here the more complex epistemicmodels and do not treat semantics (neither
completeness) of L3–L5 separately. Algebraic semantics and completeness of our
weakest modal logic L is established in [13].
Definition 3.10. [15] An EL3−-model, to which we also refer as an epistemic
model, is a Heyting algebra
M = (M,TRUE ,BEL, f⊥, f⊤, f∨, f∧, f→, f, fK)
with universe M , a designated ultrafilter TRUE ⊆ M , a set BEL ⊆ M and
additional unary operations f and fK such that for allm,m
′ ∈M the following
truth conditions are fulfilled (as before, ≤ denotes the lattice order):
(i) f(f∨(m,m
′)) ≤ f∨(f(m), f(m
′))
(ii) f(m) ≤ m
(iii) f(f→(m,m
′)) ≤ f(f→(f(m), f(m
′)))
(iv) f(m) ∈ TRUE ⇔ m = f⊤
(v) fK(m) ∈ TRUE ⇔ m ∈ BEL
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(vi) fK(f→(m,m
′)) ≤ f→(fK(m), fK(m
′))
(vii) f(m) ≤ f(fK(m))
M is the universe of all propositions and TRUE ⊆ M is the subset of classi-
cally true propositions. The propositions f⊤, f⊥ represent intuitionistic truth and
intuitionistic falsity, respectively. BEL is the set of ‘believed’ propositions. A
propositionm is said to be ‘known’ ifm ∈ TRUE ∩ BEL.11
Note that the set BEL and condition (v) are redundant data in the definition.
We could drop them and restore the set BEL defining BEL := {m ∈ M |
fK(m) ∈ TRUE}. Nevertheless, we keep these extra data in the definition in
order to explicitly indicate that belief and knowledge are extensionally modeled
as sets of propositions, similarly as classical truth. Knowledge is given as a set of
facts. In the sense of (vi), belief is ‘closed under Modus Ponens’.
We shall tacitly make use of the equivalence m ≤ m′ ⇔ f→(m,m
′) = f⊤
which holds in all Heyting algebras. Note that truth conditions (i) and (iv) ensure
that every model has the Disjunction Property: for allm,m′ ∈M , f∨(m,m
′) =
f⊤ iffm = f⊤ orm
′ = f⊤. That is, the smallest lattice filter {f⊤} is a prime filter.
Definition 3.11. LetM be an EL3−-model. We say that
• M is an EL4−-model if for allm ∈ M: f(m) ≤ f(f(m)).
• M is an EL5−-model if for allm ∈ M:
f(m) =
{
f⊤, ifm = f⊤
f⊥, else
• M is an E4Ln−-model, for n = 3, 4, 5, ifM is an ELn−-model and for
allm ∈M: fK(m) ≤ fK(fK(m)).
• M is an E5Ln−-model, n = 3, 4, 5, ifM is an E4Ln−-model and for all
m ∈M: f¬(fK(m)) ≤ fK(f¬(fK(m))).
• M is an E6Ln−-model, n = 3, 4, 5, if M is an ELn−-model and for all
m ∈M: fK(m) ≤ f(fK(m)) and f¬(fK(m)) ≤ f(f¬(fK(m))).
11We refer to the elements ofTRUE , i.e. the true propositions, also as facts. If BEL ⊆ TRUE ,
then all believed propositions are facts and belief becomes knowledge.
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• If M is an ELn−-model or an EkLn−-model, for k ∈ {4, 5, 6} and n ∈
{3, 4, 5}, andM satisfies the additional truth condition
(11) fK(m) ≤ f¬(f¬(m)) for all propositionsm,
then we omit the superscript − in the notation and refer toM as an ELn-
model or an EkLn-model, respectively. We refer to models with that addi-
tional truth condition also as models of knowledge.
Instead of “M is anEL3-model” we also simply say “M isEL3” (and similarly
for the other classes of models).
Note that in an E6Ln−-model, for any propositionm there are only two pos-
sibilities for fK(m): either fK(m) = f⊤ or fK(m) = f⊥. In fact, m ∈ BEL
⇒ fK(m) ∈ TRUE ⇒ f(fK(m)) ∈ TRUE ⇒ fK(m) = f⊤; and on the
other hand, m /∈ BEL⇒ f¬(fK(m)) ∈ TRUE ⇒ f(f¬(fK(m))) ∈ TRUE ⇒
f¬(fK(m)) = f⊤ ⇒ fK(m) = f⊥. One easily verifies that every EL5
−-model
is an EL4−-model, every E5Ln−-model is an E4Ln−-model and every E6Ln−-
model is an E5Ln−-model.
Lemma 3.12. Let M be a model. The set BEL ⊆ M of believed propositions
is a filter of the underlying Heyting algebra. IfM is a model of knowledge, i.e.
M satisfies truth condition (11) above, then BEL ⊆ TRUE and BEL is a proper
filter.
Proof. By the truth conditions (iv), (vii), (ii) and (v) of a model, f⊤ ∈ BEL.
By (vi), for any m,m′ ∈ M : if f→(m,m
′) ∈ BEL and m ∈ BEL, then m′ ∈
BEL. These two conditions are sufficient for BEL being a filter of the underlying
Heyting algebra (see, e.g., [8]). Finally, supposeM is a model of knowledge, i.e.
fK(m) ≤ f¬(f¬(m)) for all m ∈ M . Applying Lemma 3.9, we have m ∈ BEL
⇒ fK(m) ∈ TRUE ⇒ f¬(f¬(m)) ∈ TRUE ⇒ m ∈ TRUE . Hence, BEL ⊆
TRUE . Since TRUE is a proper filter, BEL is proper, too.
There is a simple characterization of EL5−- and EL5-models:
Lemma 3.13. LetM = (M,TRUE , f⊥, f⊤, f∨, f∧, f→, f, fK) be a Heyting al-
gebra with ultrafilter TRUE and additional unary operations f and fK . Then
M is anEL5−-model iff the following conditions are satisfied for allm,m′ ∈M:
(a)M has the Disjunction Property
(b)
f(m) =
{
f⊤, ifm = f⊤
f⊥, else
28
(c) fK(f→(m,m
′)) ≤ f→(fK(m), fK(m
′))
(d) fK(f⊤) = f⊤.
M is an EL5-model iff in addition to (a)–(d), the condition
(e) fK(m) ≤ f¬(f¬(m))
is satisfied for allm ∈M .
Proof. The properties (a)–(d) follow easily from the definition of anEL5−-model.
The other way round, suppose the Heyting algebraM satisfies (a)–(d). We show
thatM is anEL3−-model in the sense of Definition 3.10. Because of (b),M then
is an EL5−-model. We check the conditions (i)–(vii) of Definition 3.10. Condi-
tion (iv) follows immediately from (b), condition (v) is redundant if we define
BEL in the obvious way, and (vi) is given by (c). Note that for each m ∈ M ,
we have either f(m) = f⊥ or f(m) = f⊤. In order to verify the remaining
conditions (i)–(iii) and (vii), we may assume that the left hand side of each of
those inequalities is given by the top element f⊤. Inequality (i) then follows from
the fact thatM has the Disjunction Property. Inequality (ii) follows readily. (iii)
follows from the fact that m ≤ m′. By (d), f(fK(f⊤)) = f⊤. Now, inequality
(vii) follows. Finally, the last affirmation regarding EL5-models follows readily
from the definition.
Recall that the models of L3–L5 are defined by dropping the epistemic in-
gredients of the models of EL3−–EL5−, respectively. Lemma 3.13 then gives a
very simple characterization of L5-models: The class of L5-models is given by all
Heyting algebras with a designated ultrafilter and a modal operator f such that
the Disjunction Property and condition (b) are satisfied.
Definition 3.14. An assignment in a model M is a function γ : V → M which
extends in the canonical way to a function γ : Fm → M . More specifically,
we have γ(⊥) = f⊥, γ(⊤) = f⊤, γ(ϕ) = f(γ(ϕ)), γ(Kϕ) = fK(γ(ϕ))
and γ(ϕ ∗ ψ) = f∗(γ(ϕ), γ(ψ)), for ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}. If L is one of our modal
logics, then an L-interpretation is a tuple (M, γ) consisting of a L-model and an
assignment γ ∈MV . The relation of satisfaction is defined by
(M, γ)  ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE .
If (M, γ)  ϕ, then we say that ϕ is true inM under assignment γ ∈ MV . If ϕ
is true inM under all assignments γ ∈ MV , then we writeM  ϕ and say that
ϕ is valid inM. A formula ϕ is valid in logic L if ϕ is valid in all L-models. The
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defined notions extend in the usual way to sets of formulas.
Logical consequence in logic L is defined as usual:
Φ L ϕ :⇔ if (M, γ)  Φ then (M, γ)  ϕ,
for any L-interpretation (M, γ).
Recall that we are dealing with special non-Fregean logics in the sense that
the identity connective≡, defined by strict equivalence, satisfies Suszko’s identity
axioms (Id1)–(Id3). The intended semantics of the identity connective is ‘identity
of meaning’: we read ϕ ≡ ψ as “ϕ and ψ have the same meaning” or “ϕ and ψ
denote the same proposition”. The following result (see also [12, 14]) corresponds
exactly to that intuition:
Lemma 3.15.
(M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ ⇔ γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ).
Proof. Suppose γ(ϕ) = m and γ(ψ) = m′. Then γ(ϕ ≡ ψ) ∈ TRUE iff
f(f→(m,m
′)) ∈ TRUE and f(f→(m
′, m)) ∈ TRUE iff f→(m,m
′) = f⊤ and
f→(m
′, m) = f⊤ iffm ≤ m
′ andm′ ≤ m iffm = m′.
Soundness and completeness of logics L and EL5 w.r.t. to corresponding
algebraic semantics is shown in [13] and [15], respectively. Those proofs can be
adapted straightforwardly to completeness results for the remaining modal logics
of our hierarchies.
Theorem 3.16 (Strong completeness). Suppose Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm and let L be any
of our modal logics. Then Φ ⊢L ϕ⇔ Φ L ϕ.
We finish this section with a discussion on self-referential propositions. Hav-
ing in mind the intended meaning of the identity connective (see Lemma 3.15),
we are able to express self-referential statements by means of equations (this kind
of modeling self-reference was proposed in [17] and subsequently used in, e.g.,
[19, 10, 11]). For instance, the equation
(12) x ≡ (x→ ⊥)
defines a version of the liar proposition. In fact, if the equation is satisfied in a
given model, then the proposition denoted by x says “This proposition implies the
absurdum” or “This proposition is false” or “I’m lying”. Fortunately, equations
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defining such paradoxical self-referential statements are unsatisfiable (for essen-
tially the same reasons as ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ is unsatisfiable in two-valued classical logic).
The liar proposition, as a semantic object, does not exist.
Is there a proposition saying “I am proved”? Since we identify proof with
intuitionistic truth, we are actually asking for the existence of a truth-teller propo-
sition “I am true”, where we mean intuitionistic truth. This is a non-paradoxical
proposition which can be defined by the equation
(13) x ≡ x.
Any proposition m that solves the equation is an intuitionistic truth-teller saying
“I am proved”. A truth-teller m may be classically true (i.e. m ∈ TRUE ) or
classically false (i.e. m ∈ M r TRUE ). In our specific example, there is only
one potential true truth-teller, namely the top element f⊤ of a model (because of
truth condition (iv) of Definition 3.10). The top element of each L4-model is a
truth-teller, since f(m) = f⊤⇔m = f⊤. On the other hand, in every L5-model,
the proposition f⊥ is a false truth-teller. In models which are not L5, there might
exist further truth-tellers that are classically false, i.e. fixed points of f not be-
longing to TRUE .
Recall that we may read ♦ϕ as “ϕ is consistent (with the given set of proved
propositions)”. Is there a proposition asserting its own consistency? We are asking
for a solution of the equation
(14) x ≡ ♦x.
One easily checks that in any L4-model, the bottom element f⊥ is a solution; and
in an L5-model, the top element f⊤ is a solution as well. So (14) is a further exam-
ple of an equation allowing both true and false propositions as solutions in suitable
models. There might exist further solutions distinct from f⊤ and f⊥. Finally, a
proposition that asserts its own inconsistency is described by the equation
(15) x ≡ ¬♦x.
An alternative version of that self-referential statement is given by the equation
(16) x ≡ ¬x.
The difference between both equations is subtle. In fact, ¬♦x = ¬¬¬x and
¬x are logically equivalent formulas in our classical modal logics. From an in-
tuitionistic point of view, however, they express different intensions and therefore
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may denote different propositions. Suppose equation (16) is true in a given model.
Then the propositionm denoted by x says “There is an actual proof that I am false”
or, in other words, “I am inconsistent with the proved propositions”. Supposem is
classically true, i.e. m = f(f¬((m)) ∈ TRUE , then, by truth condition (iv) of a
model, f¬(m) = f⊤, i.e. m = f⊥ /∈ TRUE . This contradiction shows thatm can-
not be classically true. So whenever equation (16) is satisfied, the propositionm
denoted by x must be classically false. Furthermore,m cannot be the proposition
f⊥ for otherwise m = f(f¬(m)) = f(f¬(f⊥)) = f(f⊤) ∈ TRUE , contra-
dicting m /∈ TRUE . We conclude that m is a false proposition distinct from f⊥.
In particular, m has a possible proof (i.e. m is consistent with the proved propo-
sitions). Hence, m is a consistent proposition asserting its own inconsistency.
This sounds paradoxical. Note, however, that m is classically false – so there is
no paradox. As a non-paradoxical proposition, a solution of (16) should exist in
some model. Interestingly, sincem /∈ {f⊤, f⊥}, no L5-model satisfies (16).
The simplest self-referential statements involving knowledge are described by
the equations
(17) x ≡ Kx
(18) x ≡ ¬Kx.
Obviously, if (17) is true, then the proposition denoted by x says “I am known”,
and if (18) is true, then x denotes a proposition saying “I am unknown”. Equation
(17) is satisfied in every model where x denotes f⊤. Consider equation (18) and
assume that K stands for knowledge as true belief, i.e. schemeKϕ→ ϕ is valid.
Then a solution must be a proposition that is classically true and unknown. If
K refers to belief and not to knowledge, i.e. Kϕ → ϕ does not hold, then (18)
may have classically false propositions as solutions. Such a proposition then says
something like “Nobody believes in me”, which is false. The equations
x ≡ ♦Kx
x ≡ ¬♦Kx
define propositions asserting something like “I’m believable (knowable)” and “I’m
unbelievable (unknowable)”, respectively. These are further examples of non-
paradoxical self-referential statements, i.e. the corresponding equations are satis-
fiable.
In the last section, we present a stronger logic where epistemic operatorK be-
comes a total truth predicate. The epistemic self-referential propositions discussed
here then become statements about classically truth or falsity.
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4 Relational semantics for logics extending L5
In this section, we show that the S5-style modal logics of our hierarchy, i.e. those
containing the modal axioms (A4) and (A5), are complete w.r.t. a relational se-
mantics based on intuitionistic general frames. We are unable to find any kind of
possible worlds semantics for weaker logics of our hierarchy. Interestingly, the
presented semantic framework also describes the intuitionistic epistemic logics
IEL− and IEL presented in [4], as we shall see in the next section.
As in the preceding section, we work here with the full epistemic language Fm.
However, dropping the epistemic ingredients from Definition 4.1 below (more
specifically: function E) results in (much simpler) frames for non-epistemic logic
L5 over the modal sublanguage Fm1 ⊆ Fm. In this way, relational semantics for
L5, as well as corresponding soundness and completeness proofs, are implicitly
contained in the following approach.
Definition 4.1. An EL5−-frame F = (W,R, P, E, wT ) is given by
• a non-empty setW of worlds
• a partial ordering R ⊆ W ×W , called accessibility relation, such thatW
has an R-smallest element w⊥ (the bottom of the frame) and every R-chain
has an upper bound in W (Zorn’s Lemma then ensures that each w ∈ W
accesses an R-maximal element); for w ∈ W let R(w) := {w′ ∈ W |
wRw′}; and letMax(W ) be the set of all R-maximal elements
• a set P ⊆ Pow(W ) of upper sets (recall that A ∈ Pow(W ) is an upper set
if for all w,w′ ∈ W : if w ∈ A and wRw′, then w′ ∈ A)
• a function E : W → Pow(P ) such that
– for each w ∈ W , E(w) ⊆ P is a filter on P , i.e. E(w) is a non-empty
set with the following properties: if A ∈ E(w) and B ∈ E(w), then
A ∩B ∈ E(w); and if A ∈ E(w) and A ⊆ B ∈ P , then B ∈ E(w)
– for all w,w′ ∈ W : wRw′ implies E(w) ⊆ E(w′); i.e. E is a mono-
tonic function onW
• a designated R-maximal element wT ∈ W .
Furthermore, we require that P is closed under the following conditions:
(a) ∅,W ∈ P
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(b) If A,B ∈ P , then the following sets are elements of P :
A ∩ B
A ∪ B
A ⊃ B := {w ∈ W | for all w′ ∈ R(w), w′ ∈ A implies w′ ∈ B}
KA := {w ∈ W | A ∈ E(w)}.
Intuitively, P is viewed as the set of all propositions. For each w ∈ W , the
elements of filter E(w) ⊆ P are the propositions believed at world w. ForA ∈ P ,
the set KA = {w ∈ W | A ∈ E(w)} is the proposition saying “A is believed
(known)”. Note that KA is an upper set because E is a monotonic function on
W . Also note that because ofW ∈ P it holds thatW ∈ E(w), for any w ∈ W .
Definition 4.2. Let F = (W,R, P, E, wT ) be an EL5
−-frame. F is
• an E4L5−-frame if A ∈ E(w) implies {w′ ∈ W | A ∈ E(w′)} ∈ E(w),
for any w ∈ W and A ∈ P .
• an E5L5−-frame if F is an E4L5−-frame and for every w ∈ W and every
A ∈ P : if A /∈ E(w′) for all w′ ∈ R(w), then the proposition {w′′ ∈ W |
A ∈ E(w′′)} ⊃ ∅ belongs to E(w).
• anE6L5−-frame if for allw ∈ W ,E(w) = E(w⊥), where w⊥ is the bottom
world. That is, E : W → Pow(P ) is a constant function and there is only
one (global) set of believed propositionsE(w⊥) which we simply denote by
E := E(w⊥).
• an EkL5-frame, for k ∈ {4, 5, 6}, if F is an EkL5−-frame and for every
w ∈ W , each element of E(w) contains all those maximal worlds which
are accessible from w:
Max(W ) ∩ R(w) ⊆ A, for each A ∈ E(w).12
The condition of an E4L5−-frame says that whenever a proposition A is be-
lieved at w, then the proposition “A is believed” is believed at w. The E5L5−-
condition says that if propositionA is unbelievable from the point of view of world
w, then the proposition “A is unbelievable” is believed at w. In an E6L5−-frame,
a propositionA is believed at some world iffA is believed at all worlds iffA ∈ E.
12It follows in particular that ∅ /∈ E(w), i.e. E(w) is a proper filter on P .
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Consequently, for any A ∈ P , the proposition KA = {w ∈ W | A ∈ E(w)},
“A is believed”, is either given by the whole set W or by the empty set. Finally,
the condition of an EkL5-frame says that if a proposition A is believed at world
w, then A is true at all maximal worlds accessible from w. This is equivalent
to the following: If a proposition A is believed at world w, then for any world
w′ accessible from w, A cannot be false at w′. This is a semantic counterpart of
intuitionistic reflection, i.e. axiom scheme (IntRe). Under this condition, belief
becomes knowledge.
It is clear by the definition that every E5L5−-frame is an E4L5−-frame. Fur-
thermore:
Lemma 4.3. Every E6L5−-frame is an E5L5−-frame.
Proof. Suppose we are given an E6L5−-frame. Then E = E(w) = E(w⊥), for
all w ∈ W . Let A ∈ E, for some A ∈ P . Then, {w ∈ W | A ∈ E(w)} =
W ∈ E. So the condition of an E4L5−-frame is satisfied. Now, assume A /∈ E.
That is, A /∈ E(w) for all w ∈ W . Hence, {w ∈ W | A ∈ E(w)} = ∅ and
(∅ ⊃ ∅) = W ∈ E. Thus, the condition of an E5L5−-frame holds, too.
An assignment (or valuation) in a given frame F = (W,R, P, E, wT ) is a
function g : V → P . Given a frame F and an assignment g in F , we call the tuple
(F , g) a relational model based on frameF . Given a relational modelK = (F , g),
the relation of satisfaction w  ϕ, read: “ϕ is true at w”, between worlds and for-
mulas is defined by induction on the complexity of formulas, simultaneously for
all worlds of the underlying frame F :
w 2 ⊥
w  x :⇔ w ∈ g(x)
w  ϕ ∨ ψ :⇔ w  ϕ or w  ψ
w  ϕ ∧ ψ :⇔ w  ϕ and w  ψ
w  ϕ→ ψ :⇔ for all w′ ∈ R(w), w′  ϕ implies w′  ψ
w  ϕ :⇔ w⊥  ϕ
w  Kϕ :⇔ ϕ∗ ∈ E(w), where ϕ∗ := {w′ ∈ W | w′  ϕ}.
We write (F , w)  ϕ instead of w  ϕ when we wish to emphasize the ambi-
ent model F . Notice that “ϕ is false at w” means that w  ¬ϕ, i.e. ϕ is not true at
all accessible worlds.
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We observe that the meaning of the logical connectives is defined as in Kripke
semantics of IPC while the necessity operator behaves as in Kripke semantics
of modal logic S5: (w, g)  ϕ ⇔ for all w′ ∈ W , (w′, g)  ϕ. The latter
follows from the fact that we are dealing with rooted frames in which the usual
monotonicity condition of intuitionistic frames holds: formulas true at some world
remain true at accessible worlds (see the next Remark).
Remark 4.4. Let K = (F , g) be a relational model with a set P of propositions.
We extend the assignment g : V → P to a function g : Fm → P defining re-
cursively g(⊥) := ∅, g(ϕ ∨ ψ) := g(ϕ) ∪ g(ψ), g(ϕ ∧ ψ) := g(ϕ) ∩ g(ψ),
g(ϕ→ ψ) := g(ϕ) ⊃ g(ψ), and
g(Kϕ) := {w | g(ϕ) ∈ E(w)},
g(ϕ) :=
{
W, if w⊥ ∈ g(ϕ)
∅, else.
By closure properties of P , it follows inductively that g is well-defined, i.e.
g(ϕ) is an element of P , for any ϕ ∈ Fm. Also by induction on the complexity of
formulas, simultaneously for all worlds w ∈ W , one shows that for all w ∈ W
and all ϕ ∈ Fm, w  ϕ ⇔ w ∈ g(ϕ). That is, g(ϕ) = {w ∈ W | w  ϕ} = ϕ∗,
for any ϕ ∈ Fm. In particular, each ϕ∗ = g(ϕ) is a proposition, i.e. an element
of P . Since all propositions are upper sets, the usual monotonicity condition of
intuitionistic models follows: if w  ϕ and wRw′, then w′  ϕ.
Definition 4.5. Let K = (F , g) be a relational model with designated maximal
world wT , and let ϕ ∈ Fm. We say that K is a model of ϕ, or ϕ is (classically)
true in K, notation: K  ϕ, if
(K, wT )  ϕ,
i.e. if ϕ is true at wT . This notion extends in the usual way to sets of formulas.
Let L be the logic EL5−, EL5, EkL5−, or EkL5, for k ∈ {4, 5, 6}. We denote
byMod rL(Φ) the class of all relational models of Φ which are based on L-frames,
and we consider the following relation of logical consequence:
Φ rL ψ :⇔ Mod
r
L(Φ) ⊆ Mod
r
L({ψ}),
where Φ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ Fm.
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Theorem 4.6 (Soundness). Let L be the logic EL5−, EL5, EkL5− or EkL5, for
k ∈ {4, 5, 6}. Then for any set of formulas Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
Φ ⊢L ϕ⇒ Φ 
r
L
ϕ.
Proof. First, we consider logic L = E5L5. Let K be any model based on an
E5L5-frame. It suffices to show: K  ϕ, for all axioms ϕ of logic E5L5 (i.e.,
all axioms, along with application of rule AN, are sound); and K  ψ ∨ ¬ψ, for
all formulas ψ (i.e., tertium non datur is sound). The latter follows immediately
from the fact that truth in a model is defined as satisfaction at a maximal world.
For the former, we have to show that w⊥  ϕ, for each axiom ϕ, where w⊥ is
the bottom world. This is clear in case of theorems of IPC and their substitution-
instances (the frame is also a frame for IPC). Also the cases of (A1) and (A2)
follow readily.
(A3): It is enough to show that w⊥  ϕ → ψ implies w⊥  ϕ → ψ. This
follows easily from the definition of satisfaction.
(A4): It is enough to show that w⊥  ϕ implies w⊥  ϕ. Again, this is clear by
the definition of satisfaction.
(A5): Truth of ¬ϕ at some world implies truth of ¬ϕ at all worlds implies
truth of ¬ϕ at all worlds.
(KBel): K(ϕ → ψ) → (Kϕ → Kψ). Let w ∈ W . It is enough to show the
following:
If (ϕ→ ψ)∗ ∈ E(w) and ϕ∗ ∈ E(w′), for any w′ ∈ R(w), then ψ∗ ∈ E(w′).
Suppose the premises hold true and let w′ ∈ R(w). Then E(w) ⊆ E(w′). Thus,
(ϕ→ ψ)∗ ∈ E(w′). Since E(w′) is a filter, it follows that A := (ϕ→ ψ)∗ ∩ϕ∗ ∈
E(w′) and A ⊆ ψ∗ ∈ E(w′).
(CoRe): ϕ → Kϕ. It is enough to show that w⊥  ϕ implies w⊥  Kϕ.
Suppose w⊥  ϕ. Then ϕ
∗ = W . Moreover, W ∈ E(w), for every w ∈ W . In
particular, ϕ∗ ∈ E(w⊥). Thus, w⊥  Kϕ.
(IntRe): Kϕ → ¬¬ϕ. Suppose w  Kϕ. Then ϕ∗ ∈ E(w). Since we are
dealing with an E5L5-frame, ϕ∗ contains all maximal worlds accessible from w,
i.e. w′  ϕ, for all w′ ∈ Max(W ) ∩ R(w). Then for all w′′ ∈ W accessible from
w, we have w′′ 2 ¬ϕ. Hence, w  ¬¬ϕ.
(E4): Let w  Kϕ. Then ϕ∗ ∈ E(w). By the property of an E4L5-frame,
{w′ ∈ W | ϕ∗ ∈ E(w′)} = {w′ ∈ W | w′  Kϕ} = (Kϕ)∗ ∈ E(w). Thus,
w  KKϕ.
(E5): Let w  ¬Kϕ. Then for all w′ ∈ R(w), ϕ∗ /∈ E(w′). By properties of an
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E5L5-frame, A := ({w′′ ∈ W | ϕ∗ ∈ E(w′′)} ⊃ ∅) ∈ E(w).
Claim: A = (¬Kϕ)∗.
Proof of Claim. We have (¬Kϕ)∗ = {w′′′ ∈ W | w′′′  ¬Kϕ} = {w′′′ ∈ W |
ϕ∗ /∈ E(w′′) whenever w′′ ∈ R(w′′′)}. Now, by the definition of a proposition of
the form B1 ⊃ B2, one easily checks that the Claim is true.
So by the Claim, (¬Kϕ)∗ ∈ E(w). That is, w  K¬Kϕ.
Finally, we consider the case of logic L = E6L5. It remains to show that the
axiom schemes (PNB) and (NNB) are valid in the class of all models based on
E6L5-frames. But this is clear since in any E6L5-frame there is only one global
setE of known propositions: a propositionA is known at some world of the frame
iff A is known at all worlds of the frame.
Towards the completeness theorem, we show that for any algebraic model of
some of our S5-style logics there is a relational model that satisfies precisely the
same set of formulas. Completeness w.r.t. relational semantics then will follow
from completeness w.r.t. algebraic semantics.
Theorem 4.7. Let L ∈ {EL5−, EL5, EkL5−, EkL5 | k ∈ {4, 5, 6}} and let
(M, γ) be an algebraic L-interpretation. Then there is a relational model K =
(F , g), based on a L-frame F , such that for all ϕ ∈ Fm:
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ K  ϕ.
Proof. We prove the assertion in detail for the case L = E5L5. The remain-
ing cases then follow straightforwardly. Suppose we are given a L-interpretation
(M, γ)with ultrafilterTRUE ⊆M of true propositions and filter BEL ⊆ TRUE
of known propositions. Let W be the set of all prime filters of the Heyting alge-
bra reduct of M. For w,w′ ∈ W , we define wRw′ :⇔ w ⊆ w′. Then W is
partially ordered by R, wT := TRUE is a maximal element and w⊥ := {f⊤} is
the smallest element, i.e. the ‘bottom world’. In fact, the Disjunction Property of
a model ensures that the smallest filter {f⊤} is prime. Recall that the union of a
non-empty chain of prime filters is again a prime filter. Thus, every R-chain inW
has an upper bound inW . For w ∈ W put
BEL(w) := {m ∈M | fK(m) ∈ w}.
Obviously, BEL = BEL(TRUE). Form ∈M , we define
m+ := {w ∈ W | m ∈ w}.
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The set of propositions of the desired frame is
P := {m+ ⊆W | m ∈M},
and the set of propositions known at world w is
E(w) := {m+ ⊆ W | m ∈ BEL(w)}.
In the following, we show that F = (W,R, P, E, wT ) is an EL5
−-frame. We
have to check that F satisfies all conditions of Definition 4.1. It is clear that the
elements m+ ∈ P are upper sets under inclusion, i.e. under R. Suppose wRw′,
i.e. w ⊆ w′. Then clearly BEL(w) ⊆ BEL(w′) and thus E(w) ⊆ E(w′). The
mappingm 7→ m+ defines a one-to-one correspondence between the propositions
m ∈ M of the algebraic model and the propositionsm+ ∈ P of the frame.13 By
properties of prime filters (see also item (d) of Lemma 3.9) and by the definitions,
it follows that for allm,m′ ∈M :
m+ ∩m′+ = f∧(m,m
′)+
m+ ∪m′+ = f∨(m,m
′)+
m+ ⊃ m′+ = f→(m,m
′)+
K(m+) = {w ∈ W | m+ ∈ E(w)} = fK(m)
+
Of course, P also contains ∅ = (f⊥)+ and W = (f⊤)+ and thus satisfies the
closure conditions established in Definition 4.1. Furthermore, it follows that
(P,∪,∩,⊃,∅,W ) forms, in the obvious way, a Heyting algebra with least and
greatest elements ∅, W , respectively. Although not necessary for this proof, we
may consider the following additional operations on that Heyting algebra:
fPK(m
+) := K(m+) = {w ∈ W | m+ ∈ E(w)} = fK(m)
+
fP (m
+) :=
{
W = (f⊤)
+ = f(m)
+ ifm = f⊤
∅ = (f⊥)
+ = f(m)
+ ifm 6= f⊤
for allm ∈M , and observe that this results in a structure that is isomorphic to the
original EL5−-model. In fact, one easily recognizes that the mapm 7→ m+ is an
13Surjectivity is clear. Towards injectivity suppose m+ = m′+, i.e. m and m′ are contained
in exactly the same prime filters. Item (d) of Lemma 3.9 then implies, f→(m,m
′) = f⊤ and
f→(m
′,m) = f⊤ (recall that {f⊤} is the smallest prime filter). But this means that m ≤ m
′ and
m′ ≤ m, i.e. m = m′.
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isomorphism between Heyting algebras. Suppose m = f⊤. Since we are dealing
with an EL5−-model, we have f(m) = f⊤ and thus, by truth conditions (vii)
and (ii) of an algebraic model, fK(m) = f⊤ ∈ w, as w is a filter. By definition of
BEL(w), m = f⊤ ∈ BEL(w). We have shown that for every w ∈ W , BEL(w)
contains the top element f⊤ of the underlying Heyting lattice, and E(w) 6= ∅.
Now, in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 3.12, with TRUE replaced by
w, one shows that the sets BEL(w) are filters onM . Then it follows that the sets
E(w) are filters on P . Thus, F = (W,R, P, E, wT ) is an EL5
−-frame. Let us
show thatF is an E5L5−-frame according to Definition 4.2. Supposew ∈ W and
m+ ∈ E(w). Then m ∈ BEL(w) and fK(m) ∈ w. SinceM is an E4L5-model,
we have fK(m) ≤ fK(fK(m)) and thus fK(fK(m)) ∈ w (w is a filter). It follows
that fK(m)
+ = K(m+) = {w ∈ W | m+ ∈ E(w)} ∈ E(w). Now suppose
w ∈ W and for all w′ ∈ R(w), m+ /∈ E(w′). Then fK(m) /∈ w
′ for all prime
filters w′ extending prime filter w. That is, f¬(fK(m)) ∈ w (see Lemma 3.9).
Using the fact that M is an E5L5−-model, we conclude fK(f¬(fK(m))) ∈ w.
By definition of the sets BEL(w) and E(w), we get f¬(fK(m)) ∈ BEL(w) and
thus
f¬(fK(m))
+ = f→(fK(m), f⊥)
+ = fK(m)
+ ⊃ (f⊥)
+
= {w′′ ∈ W | m+ ∈ E(w′′)} ⊃ ∅ ∈ E(w).
Hence, F is an E5L5−-frame. Moreover, sinceM is a model of knowledge, we
have fK(m) ≤ f¬(f¬(m)) for all m ∈ M . So if m ∈ BEL(w), then fK(m) ∈ w
and thus f¬(f¬(m)) ∈ w. That is, m ∈ BEL(w) implies that m belongs to all
maximal worlds, i.e. ultrafilters, accessible from w:
m ∈ BEL(w)⇒ m ∈ w′ for all w′ ∈Max(W ) ∩ R(w).
Hence,
m+ ∈ E(w)⇒ Max(W ) ∩R(w) ⊆ m+.
In particular,∅ /∈ E(w) and E(w) is a proper filter on P , for every w ∈ W . Thus,
F = (W,R, P, E, wT ) is an E5L5-frame in the sense of Definition 4.2. Now, we
define the following assignment g : V → P in F :
g(x) := γ(x)+,
for each x ∈ V . Using induction, Remark 4.4 and the previous results, one shows
that
g(ϕ) = γ(ϕ)+,
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for all ϕ ∈ Fm. For instance, using the induction hypothesis, we have γ(Kψ)+ =
fK(γ(ψ))
+ = {w ∈ W | γ(ψ)+ ∈ E(w)} = {w ∈ W | g(ϕ) ∈ E(w)} =
g(Kψ). We consider the relational model K = (F , g). By Remark 4.4, g(ϕ) =
ϕ∗ = γ(ϕ)+. So we have for all w ∈ W and all ϕ ∈ Fm:
w  ϕ⇔ w ∈ ϕ∗ ⇔ w ∈ γ(ϕ)+ ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ w.
In particular, for the designated maximal world wT = TRUE :
K  ϕ⇔ wT  ϕ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ wT = TRUE ⇔ (M, γ)  ϕ.
We have proved the assertion of the Theorem for the case L = E5L5 and, im-
plicitly, also for the cases L ∈ {E5L5−, E4L5−, E4L5}. Finally, let us con-
sider the cases L ∈ {E6L5−, E6L5}. We suppose that M is an E6L5-model.
Applying the above construction, it suffices to show that the resulting function
E : W → Pow(P ) is constant, i.e. E(w) = E(w⊥), for all w ∈ W . By prop-
erties of an E6L5−-model, for every m ∈ M , there are exactly two possibilities:
either fK(m) = f⊤ or fK(m) = f⊥, see the remark following Definition 3.11.
It follows that for any w ∈ W : m ∈ BEL(w) ⇔ fK(m) ∈ w ⇔ fK(m) =
f⊤ ⇔ m ∈ BEL. That is, BEL(w) = BEL for all w ∈ W and function E is
constant.
Corollary 4.8 (Completeness w.r.t. relational semantics). Let L be EL5−, EL5,
EkL5− or EkL5, for k ∈ {4, 5, 6}. Then for any Ψ ∪ {χ} ⊆ Fm,
Ψ r
L
χ⇒ Ψ ⊢L χ.
Proof. SupposeΨ 0L χ. By standard arguments, the setΨ∪{¬χ} is consistent in
classical logicL. By algebraic completeness, we know that there is some algebraic
L-interpretation (M, γ) satisfying that set. By Theorem 4.7, there is a relational
model K based on a L-frame such that K  Ψ ∪ {¬χ}. This shows Ψ 1r
L
χ.
Once more, we point out that the above constructions specialize straightfor-
wardly to soundness and completeness proofs for logic L5 w.r.t. relational seman-
tics (considering the modal sublanguage Fm1). Relational semantics for L5 is
defined exactly as above (Definition 4.1 and the following definition of the satis-
faction relation), though, without the epistemic components, i.e. without function
E and operatorK.
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5 A new relational semantics for IEL− and IEL
In this section, we work with the pure epistemic sublanguage Fme := {ϕ ∈ Fm |
symbol  does not occur in ϕ}. As already mentioned above, the intuitionistic
epistemic logics IEL− and IEL, introduced by Artemov and Protopopescu [4],
can be axiomatized in language Fme by the axioms (INT), distribution of be-
lief (KBel) K(ϕ → ψ) → (Kϕ → Kψ), intuitionistic co-reflection ϕ → Kϕ,
and – only in case of IEL – intuitionistic reflection (IntRe) Kϕ → ¬¬ϕ. The
only reference rule is Modus Ponens MP. In [4] it is shown that IEL− and IEL
are sound and complete w.r.t. possible worlds semantics based on intuitionistic
Kripke models. In this section, we show that these logics are sound and complete
w.r.t. relational semantics of the kind presented in the preceding section. More
precisely, IEL− and IEL are complete w.r.t. classes of special EL5−- and EL5-
frames, respectively, which are now interpreted from the intuitionistic instead of
the classical point of view. Consequently, the systems of Intuitionistic Epistemic
Logic introduced in [4] and the modal logics EL5− and EL5 (and their exten-
sions) can be described within the same semantic framework.
Definition 5.1. An IEL−-frame (an IEL-frame) F = (W,R, P, E) is defined
in exactly the same way as an EL5−-frame (an EL5-frame), respectively (see
Definition 4.1), but without a designated maximal world and with the following
additional condition of intuitionistic co-reflection:
(IntCo) For every w ∈ W and for all propositions A ∈ P : w ∈ A⇒ A ∈ E(w).
Intuitively, (IntCo) says that whenever a proposition A is true at some world
w, then A is believed/known at w. This is a rather strong condition which, in
particular, implies positive and negative introspection, as the next result shows.
Lemma 5.2. Every IEL−-frame (IEL-frame) is anE5L5−-frame (E5L5-frame),
respectively. That is, the axioms of positive and negative introspection, (E4) and
(E5), are valid.
Proof. Let F = (W,R, P, E) be an IEL−-frame. It remains to show that the
conditions of an E5L5−-frame of Definition 4.2 are satisfied. Let w ∈ W and
suppose A ∈ E(w). Then w ∈ KA = {w′ ∈ W | A ∈ E(w′)}, i.e. proposition
KA is true at w. By condition (IntCo), KA ∈ E(w). Thus, the condition of
an E4L5−-frame is satisfied. Now, suppose A /∈ E(w′) for all w′ ∈ R(w).
Then w ∈ ¬KA = ({w′′ ∈ W | A ∈ E(w′′)} ⊃ ∅). By condition (IntCo),
¬KA ∈ E(w). Thus, the condition of an E5L5−frame is satisfied.
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As before, an assignment (or valuation) in an IEL−-frame F = (W,R, P, E)
is a function g : V → P . A relational IEL−-model (IEL-model) is a tuple
K = (F , g)where F is an IEL−-frame (IEL-frame), respectively, and g is a cor-
responding assignment. Also the relation of satisfaction w  ϕ between worlds
w ∈ W and formulas ϕ ∈ Fme is defined as before, though without the clause
regarding the -operator.
Of course, the concept of intuitionistic truth in a frame-based model should
differ from the concept of classical truth in such a model. Instead of a designated
maximal world, we now define truth in a frame relative to the bottom world.
Definition 5.3. Let F be an IEL−-frame with bottom world w⊥ and let g : V →
P be an assinment. The notion of “formula ϕ ∈ Fme is true in model (F , g)” is
defined as follows:
(F , g)  ϕ :⇔ w⊥  ϕ.
We say that K = (F , g) is a (relational) IEL−-model of ϕ if ϕ is true in K.
Theorem 5.4 (Soundness). Every theorem of IEL− is true in all relational IEL−-
models, and every theorem of IEL is true in all relational IEL-models.
Proof. We consider logic IEL. Theorems of IPC and their substitution-instances
are true in relational models because suchmodels are based on intuitionisticKripke
frames. Let us show that intuitionistic co-reflection ϕ → Kϕ is valid. Suppose
we are given a relational model based on an IEL-frame and w  ϕ, for some
world w ∈ W . Then w ∈ ϕ∗ and the semantic condition (IntCo) of an IEL-frame
yields ϕ∗ ∈ E(w), i.e. w  Kϕ. Validity of intuitionistic reflection (IntRe) and
distribution of knowledge (KBel) is shown in exactly the same way as in the proof
of Theorem 4.6.
Towards completeness, we follow a similar strategy as before. That is, we
reduce completeness w.r.t. relational semantics to completeness w.r.t. algebraic
semantics. We proved in [Theorem 5.3, [15]] that IEL− and IEL are sound and
complete w.r.t. corresponding algebraic semantics. For convenience, we quote
here the definition of that algebraic semantics from [15]:
Definition 5.5. [15] An algebraic IEL−-model is a Heyting algebra
M = (M,BEL, f⊥, f⊤, f∨, f∧, f→, fK)
with propositional universe M , a set BEL ⊆ M of believed propositions and
an additional unary operation fK such that for all propositions m,m
′ ∈ M the
following truth conditions hold:
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(i) f⊤ ∈ BEL
(ii) fK(m) = f⊤ ⇔ m ∈ BEL
(iii) m ≤ fK(m)
(iv) fK(f→(m,m
′)) ≤ f→(fK(m), fK(m
′))
(v) f∨(m,m
′) = f⊤⇒ (m = f⊤ orm
′ = f⊤)
If additionally fK(m) ≤ f¬(f¬(m)) holds for all m ∈ M , then we call M an
IEL-model and BEL is the set of known propositions.
The notion of an assignment γ : V →M in an IEL−-model is given as usual.
We refer to a tuple (M, γ) as an IEL−-interpretation (IEL-interpretation) ifM
is an algebraic IEL−-model (IEL-model), respectively, and γ is a corresponding
assignment. Satisfaction (truth) of a formula ϕ ∈ Fme in an IEL
−-interpretation
(M, γ) is defined as follows:
(M, γ)  ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) = f⊤.
We quote the soundness and completeness results (in weak form) from [15]:
Theorem 5.6 ([15]). Let ϕ ∈ Fme. Then ϕ is a theorem of IEL
− (of IEL) iff ϕ is
true in all algebraic IEL−-interpretations (in all algebraic IEL-interpretations),
respectively.
The next result is an analogue to Theorem 4.7 above.
Theorem 5.7. LetM be an algebraic IEL-model and let γ ∈ MV be an assign-
ment. There is a relational IEL-model K = (F , g) such that for all ϕ ∈ Fme:
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ K  ϕ.
Proof. LetM be an algebraic IEL-model with set BEL of believed propositions,
and let γ ∈ MV be an assignment inM. The construction of an IEL-frame F
from the given algebraic IEL-model works nearly in the same way as in the proof
of Theorem 4.7, where an EL5-frame is constructed from a given algebraic EL5-
model. The role of the designated ‘maximal world’ wT = TRUE now is played
by the ‘bottom world’ w⊥ = {f⊤}. Also note that BEL = BEL(w⊥). The
frame F = (W,R, P, E) then is given in exactly the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 4.7, but without designated maximal world wT . From the definition of
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an algebraic IEL-model (Definition 5.5) it follows straightforwardly that the sets
BEL(w) and E(w) are filters. All the remaining conditions of an EL5-frame are
checked as in the proof of Theorem 4.7 (we may skip the part of the proof where
the additional conditions of an E5L5−-frame are verified). Then, as before, we
arrive at the following conclusions. For all w ∈ W and all ϕ ∈ Fme:
w  ϕ⇔ w ∈ ϕ∗ ⇔ w ∈ γ(ϕ)+ ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ w.
In particular, for the bottom world w⊥, assignment g(x) := γ(x)
+ and relational
IEL-model K = (F , g):
K  ϕ⇔ w⊥  ϕ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ w⊥ = {f⊤} ⇔ γ(ϕ) = f⊤ ⇔ (M, γ)  ϕ.
It remains to show that theEL5-frame F satisfies the additional condition (IntCo)
of an IEL-frame. Let w ∈ W be a prime filter of the algebraic model and let
m+ ∈ P be a proposition such that w ∈ m+, i.e. m ∈ w. By truth condition (iii)
of an algebraic model (see Definition 5.5), it follows that fK(m) ∈ w, since w is
a filter. Then, by the definitions,m ∈ BEL(w) and m+ ∈ E(w). We have shown
that (IntCo) holds.
It is clear that the assertion of Theorem 5.7 remains true if we replace IEL
with IEL−. Finally, we obtain (weak) soundness and completeness of the intu-
itionistic epistemic systems of [4] w.r.t. our relational semantics.
Corollary 5.8 (Completeness of IEL− and IEL w.r.t. relational semantics). A
formula ϕ ∈ Fme is a theorem of IEL
− (of IEL) iff ϕ is true in all relational
IEL−-models (IEL-models), respectively.
Proof. Soundness is shown in Theorem 5.4. Completeness follows from the The-
orems 5.6 and 5.7.
6 Final remarks
We have further investigated a hierarchy of classical modal logics, originally
presented in [15], for the reasoning about intuitionistic truth (proof), belief and
knowledge. The axioms of the S5-style logics of our hierarchy are validated by an
extended constructive BHK interpretation. Moreover, we proved soundness and
completeness of those S5-style logics w.r.t. a relational semantics based on intu-
itionistic general frames. These results confirm our modal and epistemic axioms
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as adequate principles for the reasoning about proof, belief and knowledge. We
have seen that the framework of relational semantics can also be used to describe
the intuitionistic epistemic logics introduced by Artemov and Protopopescu [4].
The precise relationship between our classical S5-style systems and the intuition-
istic epistemic logics of [4] becomes now explicit within that uniform semantic
framework. The verification-based approach to intuitionistic belief and knowl-
edge of [4] turns out to be a special case of the justification-based view on be-
lief and knowledge proposed in the present paper. From the epistemic point of
view, the essential difference consists in the axiom of intuitionistic co-reflection
ϕ→ Kϕ (besides the fact that tertium non datur holds in our modal logics but not
in IEL). That axiom corresponds to the semantic condition (IntCo): ifw ∈ A, then
A ∈ E(w), i.e. if proposition A is true at world w, then A is known at w. This
condition is not satisfied in general but must be imposed as an additional semantic
constraint on our frames. On the other hand, our modal version of co-reflection
(CoRe), ϕ→ Kϕ, is validated by our frame-based semantics without any fur-
ther assumptions. Indeed, axiom (CoRe) corresponds to the semantic condition
w⊥  ϕ⇒ w⊥  Kϕ,
where w⊥ is the bottom world. This is a property of all frames, warranted by
the definitions (in fact, w⊥  ϕ implies ϕ
∗ = W ∈ E(w), for any world w, by
definition of a frame). On the other hand, validity of intuitionistic co-reflection
ϕ→ Kϕ is equivalent to the following stronger condition:
for all w ∈ W,w  ϕ implies w  Kϕ.
This is not a general property of our frames. It must be forced by the additional
condition (IntCo). That is, original intuitionistic co-reflection ϕ→ Kϕ is strictly
stronger than its modal version ϕ → Kϕ (of course, both are interpreted in-
tuitionistically in the sense that satisfaction at the bottomworld w⊥ is considered).
Recall that the axioms (E4), (E5), (PNB) and (NNB) are not validated by
the proposed extended BHK semantics. Instead, they are considered as addi-
tional stronger epistemic principles. For instance, (PNB) along with (A2) and
rule (AN) impliesKϕ ≡ Kϕ which means that these formulas can be replaced
by each other in every context. By Theorem 3.7 (vii), (Kϕ ∨ ¬Kϕ) is a
theorem of EL5−. By replacements according to Kϕ ≡ Kϕ, we then obtain
(Kϕ ∨ ¬Kϕ), i.e. Kϕ ∨ ¬Kϕ holds intuitionistically under the assumption of
(PNB).
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We finish our investigation by presenting an analogue to (1) (see the intro-
ductory section), i.e. to the main result of [13] where it is shown that the map
ϕ 7→ ϕ embeds IPC into classical modal logic L. Actually, the proof of [Theo-
rem 5.1, [13]] works the same way with L5 instead of L. Thus, we may formulate
that result in the following way. For any set Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm0:
(19) Φ ⊢IPC ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢L5 ϕ.
We consider in the following the logic EL5∗ := L5+(IntCo)+(IntRe)+(KBel)
which results from L5 by extending the modal language Fm1 to the full language
Fm and by adding the axiom schemes ϕ→ Kϕ,Kϕ→ ¬¬ϕ andK(ϕ→ ψ)→
(Kϕ → Kψ). Of course, rule AN then applies also to those epistemic axioms.
One recognizes that EL5∗ results from EL5 by replacing (CoRe) ϕ → Kϕ
with the stronger scheme (IntCo) ϕ → Kϕ. By rule AN along with distribution
and Lemma 3.2, (ϕ → Kϕ) is a theorem of EL5∗. Thus, EL5∗ is strictly
stronger than EL5. Moreover, by (IntCo) + (IntRe) and application of (TND),
(TB) Kϕ↔ ϕ
is a theorem scheme of EL5∗. That is, the epistemic operator K becomes a truth
predicate of the object language, (TB) is an analogue to the Tarski bicondition-
als (T-scheme) of Tarski’s truth theory. Considering the original soundness and
completeness proofs of EL5, one easily checks that logic EL5∗ is sound and
complete w.r.t. to the class of those algebraic EL5-models which satisfy the addi-
tional semantic condition: m ≤ fK(m), for all propositionsm. In such a model,
the set of known propositions coincides precisely with the set of classically true
propositions, i.e. the set of facts: BEL = TRUE . One also verifies that EL5∗ is
sound and complete w.r.t. relational semantics given by the class of those EL5-
frames which satisfy the additional semantic condition (IntCo) of our IEL-frames
introduced in the previous section (recall that condition (IntCo) corresponds to in-
tuitionistic co-reflection, ϕ→ Kϕ).
Note that Kϕ ≡ ϕ is not a theorem of EL5∗, i.e. Kϕ and ϕ generally de-
note different propositions. In fact, in every model we have: m ≤ fK(m) ≤
f¬(f¬(m)), for all propositions m, and there are many Heyting algebras where
fK can be defined in such a way that those inequalities are strict. This means
that knowledge and classical truth are equivalent (viewed as predicates, they have
the same extensions) although the formulas Kϕ and ϕ have, in general, different
intensions, meanings. The discussion on self-referential propositions of section
3 now can be applied to equations in EL5∗ involving operator K as a total truth
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predicate for classical truth. For instance, the equation x ≡ Kx defines a truth-
teller: any proposition that satisfies that equation says “I am (classically) true”.
There are true and false truth-tellers, the equation is satisfiable in several ways.
The liar proposition is claimed by x ≡ ¬Kx. Whenever that equation holds in
some model, the proposition denoted by x says “I am not (classically) true”, i.e.
“This proposition is (classically) false”. Of course, no model satisfies that equa-
tion as one easily verifies by the truth conditions of a model. The liar can be
stated by an equation, though the liar proposition as a semantic object does not
exist. In this sense, we have a solution to the liar paradox. Lo¨b’s paradox can
be viewed as a contingent liar and is expressed by the equation x ≡ (Kx → ϕ),
where ϕ is any formula. If that equation is satisfied, then the proposition denoted
by x says “If this proposition is true, then proposition ϕ holds”. The equation is
satisfiable in models that satisfy ϕ. If ϕ is false, then the equation represents an
antinomy as one easily checks. These examples illustrate that the logic is able
to deal with semantic antinomies by means of equations. Neither the liar para-
dox nor contingent liars, such as Lo¨b’s paradox, give rise to inconsistencies. This
solution to semantic paradoxes is possible because we are working with a non-
Fregean logic and strictly distinguish between formulas as syntactic objects and
propositions as their meaning. Self-reference is expressed by equations on the
syntactic level. Propositions (semantic objects) satisfying such equations are self-
referential. Paradoxical self-referential propositions cannot exist since the cor-
responding self-referential equations are unsatisfiable.14 Tarski’s truth theory and
many subsequent approaches do not consider such a distinction between sentences
and propositions. If the language is sufficiently strong, a total truth predicate of
the object language then leads to the construction of the paradoxical liar sentence
and thus to the inconsistency of the underlying system.
In the classical extension EL5∗ of IEL, knowledge operatorK becomes a to-
tal truth predicate of the object language. That is, the Tarski Biconditionals (TB),
formulated in the object language, are valid. Furthermore, IEL corresponds to
EL5∗ in a similar way as IPC corresponds to L5, i.e. the following holds:
Theorem 6.1. For any set Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fme of propositional epistemic formulas:
Φ ⊢IEL ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢EL5∗ ϕ.
In particular, the embedding ϕ 7→ ϕ of IPC into L5 (into L) extends to an
14This approach to self-reference was presented in [17]; see also [10, 11, 19] for further infor-
mation.
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embedding of IEL into EL5∗. Thus, EL5∗ contains a copy of IEL in the form of
{ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fme is a theorem of IEL}.
Proof. The left-to-right-implication of the Theorem follows straightforwardly by
induction on the length of a derivation of ϕ from Φ in IEL. Towards the right-to-
left-implication, we suppose Φ 0IEL ϕ. By completeness of IEL w.r.t. our rela-
tional semantics, there exists a model K based on an IEL-frame (Definition 5.1)
that satisfies Φ but not ϕ. By definition, an IEL-frame (with a chosen designated
maximal world) is anEL5-frame satisfying the additional condition (IntCo). That
is, choosing a designated maximal world, we may interpret K as a model of EL5∗
(with our S5-style reading of modal operator ). Since K viewed as an IEL-
model satisfies Φ at the bottom world, K viewed as an EL5∗-model satisfies Φ
at every world – in particular, at the designated maximal world. By similar argu-
ments, ϕ is satisfied at no (maximal) world. Thus, Φ 1EL5∗ ϕ. Since EL5∗
is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all EL5-frames satisfying the semantic
condition (IntCo), we conclude Φ 0EL5∗ ϕ.
Because of (IntCo) ϕ → Kϕ, the following Generalization Rule holds in
EL5∗: “If ϕ is a theorem of EL5∗, then so is Kϕ.” Note that positive and nega-
tive introspection,Kϕ→ KKϕ and ¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ, respectively, are particular
instances of the scheme of intuitionistic co-reflection and are therefore theorems
of IEL as well as of EL5∗. It follows that EL5∗ contains the classical epistemic
logic KT45, i.e. the epistemic logic that corresponds to S5, where the epistemic
operator K plays the role of the modal operator . In fact, if we add tertium non
datur (TND) to IEL, then we obtain KT45+(TB). That is, KT45+(TB) extends
IEL in a similar way as CPC extends IPC. In this sense, KT45+(TB) can be seen
as the classical counterpart of IEL. Let us summarize the preceding discussion:
Logic EL5∗ contains classical epistemic logic KT45 and ‘a copy’ of intuition-
istic epistemic logic IEL via the embedding ϕ 7→ ϕ. Theorem 6.1 can be viewed
as an analogue to result (19) shown in [13].
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